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




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S.H. 1827

INQUIRY
INTO
THE STATE
OF
THE INDIAN ARMY,
WITH
SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT,
AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A
MILITARY POLICE FOR INDIA.

By WALTER BADENACH, Esq.,
CAPTAIN, BENGAL ARMY.

“ At all times, and especially situations in any degree resembling that of the
British in India, it has been found a hazardous act to reduce the advantages of
an army.”—MILLS'S *British India*.

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MDCCCXXVI.



TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN,

PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL,

4c. 4c. 4c.

SIR,

IN dedicating this work to you, I obey the joint impulses of duty and inclination. My tribute of respect to the extended views, patriotic feelings, and vigilant industry, which you have brought to the high office which you hold, may be humble, but it is sincere. I can record my own knowledge of your anxious and unceasing desire to promote every measure, which has the tendency of ensuring the stability, or improving the condition, of the great empire committed to your care.

I feel that this mark of respect is due, Sir, on account of the measures for the advantage of the civil and military service of India, which have either originated with yourself or received your sanction ; as

well as for the peculiar urbanity with which you have,
on all occasions, honoured me, when I considered it
my duty to offer representations to you on their behalf.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

With profound respect,

Your most obedient Servant,

W. BADENACH.

PREFACE.

IN writing the following pages, which were not originally intended for the public eye, my attention was turned entirely to suggesting practical improvements in a system, which, in many of its most important branches, is vicious, and I, therefore, have not bestowed what may be considered the due labour on the graces of style. But I am sure my reader will pardon inaccuracies of language or arrangement whenever they occur, if he consider that this is my only attempt at publication, and that I have been for nearly twenty years employed in active military service, a

species of occupation, which is better calculated for giving opportunities of observation, than of acquiring the art of skilfully detailing what has been observed.

It is of more consequence, however, that the matter of my publication is true and important: for the truth of every assertion, I pledge myself without fear of *contradiction*. The importance of the subject will not be denied, I believe, by any one who duly estimates the value of our empire in the East, and the vital necessity of an adequate army for the preservation of that empire. Burke, with his usual sagacity, said, it was not impossible that the fate of England would be decided in India. It is one of those remarks which do his profound genius and political foresight the greatest honour, for few men in his time could have anticipated the magnitude and importance which our empire then was

destined to attain. At present it requires small political knowledge to perceive, that if we are suddenly bereft of India, we should sink beyond calculation from the high position in which we are now placed ; and as I feel confident that the only chance of losing it arises from mismanagement of our military force there, I am anxious that the army should be so managed as to render that chance as remote as possible. This I desire on public grounds merely ; my personal interest in the arrangement, I propose, is but trifling indeed.

I hope that no one will misconstrue any observations in the following publication, nor blame the conduct of any individuals, or think that I am actuated by a desire of censuring the views of any body of men which has governed, or is now governing, India. Far different are my opinions. I think the general management of the Indian

more gratified, when I reflect that benefiting them, in the way which I propose, is conferring also an eminent service equally on India and England.

For the convenience of reference, I have divided my publication into chapters, the principal contents of which will be found on the adjoining pages.

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ON THE
INDIAN ARMY.

CHAPTER I.

IN undertaking to write of the Indian army, I shall hold myself entirely excused from entering on any panegyrics on its importance, or its general efficiency. I do not presume to think that my powers are adequate to do justice to the prowess or ability of that force, which, under the direction of the most distinguished generals that the British service—I might perhaps say the world—ever saw, has performed actions which look more like the fictions of romance, than the materials of real history. Nor if I had the power would they need the panegyric. *That* is written in the unparalleled dominion which they won and maintain—a domi-

nion, the resources of which, coupled with those of England, unite to make the greatest empire ever swayed under one sceptre *.

When we consider the discordant nature of the materials of which this army consists, that they differ as far as the greatest possible variety of climate and utmost discrepancy of religious faith can make men differ, it will be allowed that no small praise is deserved by those who have brought them to such a perfection of discipline as that which they exhibit. Wherever it has been required, the Indian army has been conspicuous for devotion to its governing power †, for gallantry in action, and exemplary conduct in the ordinary affairs of state. It has been tried in almost every species of warfare, and before every description of enemy, and has never been found wanting.

While I write, another trophy has been added

* The resources of England, and its possessions in India, are greater, both as to population and revenue, than France, Spain, Holland, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, united.

† See Appendix A.

to its arms, and the insolent government of the Burmese crouches before an army which it had the folly to despise, and which persons, quite ignorant of the powers or capabilities of that army, fancied would have been annihilated by the tumultuary force of barbarians, who dared not look it in the face.

We must not, however, suffer our partialities to prevent us from seeing that it is not as efficient as it could easily be made, or as is required by the extent of territory, the number of the population, or the magnitude of the interests and property it is expected to protect.

There are many points in it susceptible of much improvement, and these too, points of a most material nature, on which it is my intention to remark. As, however, it is my design only to discuss the means of improving its force as it stands at present, I shall waive all considerations as to the propriety of augmenting or extending it. It may be a fair matter of question whether this army is exactly what it should be. It is at all events evident, that our

entire military force in India, large as that is, and it is the largest standing army in the world, except, perhaps (and only *perhaps*) the Russian, is after all but one in four hundred of the population* (See opposite table, No. I.)—I mean of the population of the whole country south of the Indus—while in an integral part of the British empire (Ireland), it bears the proportion of one in two hundred and thirty-three. These considerations lie out of the department which I have chosen, but they are well worthy of the attention of the Indian statesman. On him it will be incumbent to consider whether the force in India be sufficient or not. This is a defect, however, which, as far as privates are concerned, could be easily remedied. They (on the Bengal establishment at least, I cannot speak so confidently of the Madras and Bombay armies) can be got of the utmost efficiency, and

* The population of the provinces, paying revenue to the Honourable Company, that of its tributaries and allies, those states whose policy requires to be strictly watched, and that of the states lately at war with us, cannot safely be computed under one hundred and twenty-five millions.

In 1796, when THE EAST ITO about Fifty-five Thousand Men.
Inted below.

HONOURABLE

GENERAL OFFICERS.

ART

Six Brigades of Horse 1796 there were fourteen General Officers
Ten Battalions Foot, and two Corps for the Staff of the Indian Army.

Gun Lascars

Ordnance Drivers present, 1826, when it is more than five times
tent it was then, there are only eighteen Ge-

CA

Officers allowed, being one General Officer
Twenty-one Regiments and One H
Irregular Native Cavalry put seventeen thousand men.

INE

large proportion of the General Officers and
Six Regiments European Infantry diers belong to His Majesty's Service, there
Serjeants with Native Corps, &c. extremely few General Officers or Colonels
One Local Corps, Madras e Company's Service, viz. eighty General
One Hundred and Forty-eight Regs, fifteen Colonels, and almost all of them
Sixty-nine Corps Irregular Native or worn out.

Pioneers, Sappers and Miners ...

Three Corps of Engineers.

merly the Honourable Company could pro-
Officers to the rank of Colonel. In 1806

Under the head of Irregulars is a limited to that of Lieutenant-Colonel, or
posted to them, also Native Fo enant-Colonel Commandant; which latter

Irregulars at each Presidency, entitles an Officer to the Off-reckonings of a

Madras 8,947 ment, but gives no rank beyond that of Lieu-

Bombay 8,841 -Colonel, nor will almost any of the Com-

Bengal 65,849 Officers ever attain higher rank, unless this
altered.

KING

Four Regiments of Light Dragoon

Eighteen Regiments of Infantry ..

Whole Military Force in India ..

to a much greater extent than we are ever likely to require. The point to which our attention ought to be chiefly directed, is the way in which it is to be officered. In this respect, notwithstanding the late improvement in the organization, it is by no means so efficient as it might easily be rendered ; in many respects it is, indeed, very faulty, and this is principally to be attributed to the original organization in 1796* ; to offer some suggestions for the improvement of which, is mainly the object of the present essay.

In so doing, I shall confine myself exclusively to the Bengal army, not merely because I am best acquainted with it, but because it strikes me as being by far the most important, when its position is taken into consideration. The presidency of Bengal, in size, population, and

* In 1796, the same number of officers was fixed for a native regiment of two battalions, sixteen hundred men, as in the King's service for a regiment amounting to six or seven hundred. At present there are but twelve hundred and one efficient officers to the whole regular army of two hundred thousand. Not more, in fact, than *one* efficient European officer to one hundred and sixty-five men.

revenue, is, beyond all moderate comparison, greater than the other two presidencies; and Indian history, even the history of our own conquests, must point out its paramount influence over the fate of the Peninsula. Before I go into the details of the subject more particularly before me, I must observe that this point does not seem sufficiently attended to. The army of Bengal, instead of bearing a due proportion to its relative importance, is not even equal to the armies of the two other presidencies. Indeed, no subject requires more careful examination, and the arrangement of a master-hand, than the whole internal military policy of India. The immense acquisitions of territory within the last ten years have made a revision of all the old system of distribution of military force requisite. (See opposite table, No. II.) The extremes of our territory are so distant from the seat of government, that very often no adequate intermediate check of local authority from headquarters exists, and armies are required to cover districts double the size of those ori-

Distribution.		
DESCRIPTION.	Strength of each description of Force. ars.	Number of European Officers for the whole Army, and how disposed of.
ARTILLERY.		
Horse.....	15,782	If complete, the Establishment is } 4,577
Foot		
Golundauze 47		At present it is short about . 400
Ditto 38		4,177
Artillery Lascars 40		Inefficient for want of experience, having been added to the army within the last three or four years . } 1,400
Ordnance Drivers 65		
		2,777
CAVALRY.		
Governor-General's Body Guard	26,094	General Officers, Colonels, and inferior Ranks in Europe on Furlough, or Sick Certificate, or absent to places within the limits of the Charter, or for the benefit of their health in India } 898
Regular Native Cavalry		
Irregular Native Cavalry 97		
		1,879
INFANTRY:		
European Infantry	234,412	Employed on the General Staff, or Establishments connected with the Army and doing duty with Irregular Corps } 678
Ditto		
Serjeants attached to European Corps, &c.		Leaving efficient Officers for the whole of the Company's regular army about } 1,201
Regular Native Infantry		
Irregular Native infantry 90		Or in the ratio of one efficient Officer to 165 men.
Local Infantry.....		
Volunteer Battalions 97		
Infantry Levies and Escorts..		
Provincial Battalions and } 88		
Mug Levy.....		
Pioneers, Sappers and Miners 75	4,575	
KING'S TROOPS.		
Light Dragoons	280,863	KING'S OFFICERS.
Infantry.....	21,934	
Whole Military Force in India, ...	302,797	Light Dragoons 173
		Infantry 864
		1,036
		The number absent from their Corps not correctly ascertained.

ginally intended for them. This has given rise to the employment of irregulars*,—a species of force not safe to use, and which operates unfairly on the prospects of the regular officer, as I shall explain more fully hereafter. But if I entered on the military policy of India, I should digress too far from my particular design; I am satisfied, therefore, with throwing out the above hints. In the fourth chapter I shall say more about it.

Seeing, as I do, many defects in the system of 1796, I am very far from wishing to blame those from whom it originated. The unsettled state of the Indian revenue at that time, both as to its amount and permanency, coupled with the appearance of a protracted war both in Europe and India, rendered it, as a matter of common precaution, indispensably necessary on the part of the executive to be extremely cautious in introducing any system which was likely to be productive of a permanent expense, the effect of

* Irregular corps are resorted to merely to save expense, as the European officers are borrowed from the regular corps.

paign, will seldom be found on the Bengal establishment to have more than one field officer, one captain, and six or seven subalterns present with it, and some of the latter very inexperienced.

Let us suppose that a regiment of a thousand strong, with ten companies thus officered, is called on service, perhaps the disposition would be nearly this. The two senior officers, with the main body, one subaltern as adjutant, one as quarter-master, one to each of the advance and rear guards, one to each of the three flank companies (for on the Bengal establishments we* are enabled, from the size of the men, to have two grenadier companies to each regiment.) Seven companies would be thus left without any European officer, and be commanded by native officers, who require to be very closely looked after. I

* I have known four grenadier companies and a light company in one regiment, two supplementary grenadier companies having been formed on taking away the grenadiers for temporary service.

have no hesitation in saying, that, be the judgment, professional skill, and energy of the commander ever so superior, it is simply impossible that such a corps can be anything like efficient.

If, what is very probable, it were found necessary to detach the three flank companies, they must either be commanded by a subaltern, or if the only captain present is detached with them, then four out of the eight or nine officers will be with these three companies; and in case of any accident happening to the field officer, the command of the main body would devolve on a subaltern of perhaps a few years standing, and it would not require very arduous service to deprive it of all its European officers. This actually occurred at Bhurt-pore, to a detachment of the second European regiment. I recollect an instance where, after all the European officers were disabled, the native officers and sepoy succeeded in storming a fort (Entaree), and not having any European officer to restrain them, put all to death

are now permitted to do. They at present amount in Bengal alone, to ten thousand men more than our whole Indian regular force did thirty years ago.

With respect to the drain on corps, arising from employing officers on staff situations, I am well aware that it is resorted to, from the most liberal principles*, as it is not in the power of the Company to confer either honours or high rank on their military servants; and the emoluments thence arising, render this system of course very agreeable to the officers so employed. Yet it is impossible not to see that when carried to such an extent as at present, it is attended with results seriously injurious to the service, by making staff employments naturally so much preferred by officers in general. I should be very sorry to suggest any proposal which could injure in any way the prospects of those in the service; but a regard for the efficiency of the army urges me to wish for the modification of these staff em-

* See Appendix D.

ployments on a different footing. It would not be difficult, in my opinion, so to arrange it as to separate what is really useful from what is injurious, and to benefit at the same time the general staff, the corps of the line, and the officers employed in both, without creating any extra expense worth speaking of. I am quite certain that the granting of rank commensurate with length of service would be more useful to the army in all its branches, and more agreeable to the feelings and ulterior interests of its members in general, than any advantages that can be drawn from the chance of staff employ.

I should propose that field officers, I might indeed extend it to captains, holding staff appointments of such a nature as to prevent them from joining their corps for a period beyond that allowed to an officer on furlough in Europe, should be struck off the strength of their corps. This, I repeat, the efficiency of the service imperiously demands. But there is a description of corps much required in India, to which these officers might be very properly attached.

Every person conversant with the state of our Indian army has felt the necessity of veteran regiments, and as they *must* eventually be raised, I propose that the staff officers should be attached exclusively to them. Such native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of each of the regular corps of native infantry and cavalry as are of good character, and have, from age or infirmities acquired in the service, become unfitted for the active service of the line, and yet are too good for the invalid establishment, should, after due examination, be struck off the strength of corps of the line, and formed into veteran regiments in the proportion of one veteran regiment to ten of the line. These corps should consist each of ten companies, with one colonel having a double regiment, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, and ten captains, who might be supplied from those of the line holding staff employments. Let these officers be formed into one general list according to seniority in the army, in which list they shall rise as in the artillery, and then

be divided equally among the veteran corps in the same way as officers are posted to battalions in the artillery. The formation of these veteran corps would be felt as a great benefit by the native soldiery, whom, from the nature of our tenure in India, we ought to endeavour to attach to the service by every act of kindness that is consistent with the judicious expenditure of the public money: it would be highly advantageous to the service generally, and materially tend to increase the efficiency of regiments of the line.

After taking away officers employed on the general staff from corps of the line, the army should be levelled, and from that time no removals from one corps to another should be allowed unless in case of the increase of the army, or between an officer of the line, and a staff officer (which should be permitted only when they stood next to each other in the same corps of the line, and it was in all other respects unexceptionable); and the places of officers removed to the general staff should be imme-

diately filled up from their respective corps. The less frequently such exchanges took place, so much the better. To prevent inequality of promotion in corps, no more than one officer should be taken from any one regiment till all had been gone over in the same way, unless in very particular cases. As for forming, as has sometimes been proposed, a separate staff corps by sending out cadets for it, it would be highly prejudicial, as it would give officers nothing to look to but regimental duty, and divert patronage from its just and legitimate channel. Staff employ should be as at present, open to all the service.

This plan would permit officers belonging to particular departments (such as the commissariat), in which they had served for a long period, say ten or fifteen years, and had not during that period had a furlough, to be indulged with one under certain restrictions. A staff officer for instance going on furlough for the recovery of his health, should vacate his employment on going to Europe, but on his

return, his previous services and efficiency should have their weight, in reappointing him in his own department or in another for which he might be suited.

It would also do justice to the regimental officer, who would thus have the due benefit of any casualties that occur in his corps on actual service. No system ought to be continued which does not secure that just right. It is one of the few chances in favour of the regimental officer, and any plan which deprives him of that and gives a participation in its advantages to individuals holding situations as purely civil, as the duties of a mayor of Bombay, or a collector of the customs, is neither just nor consistent. Depriving officers of this chance has also done much to render volunteering for distant service so disadvantageous, that no man of common sense will ever again enter a volunteer corps, where he will at the hazard of his life work for the benefit of those who are remaining inactive at home.

A tenth part of the regular native infantry

on the Bengal establishment, served as volunteers for upwards of five years between 1810 and 1816. I was myself in a volunteer corps at the reduction of Java, in 1811, in which in a few months we lost four captains out of six, and a great many other officers ; yet it gave no promotion to any one unless those belonging to the same corps in India, and who happened to be junior to the individuals who died or were killed. And exactly similar would be the prospects of officers, if the plan were adopted, that has often been proposed, of forming corps of officers without privates, in order to fill up vacancies, as far as doing duty went, occasioned in corps by the removal of officers to staff situations ; so that if all the other officers of a regiment were to fall, it would not give the individual so employed any promotion. Does it deserve belief that any man of prudence would remain satisfied under such a system ? It might so happen that almost all the arduous duty of the whole army would fall on a very few officers.

The only fair plan is to let officers take their chance with their corps, as is done in all other services, and why not in this? We need go no further for a model than that army with which the Company's is constantly obliged to act; the success that has attended its operations against the finest troops in the world, is the surest test of the efficiency of its organization.

2. But the greatest defect which is in the system of 1796, although much improved by late alterations, is, that it keeps an officer so long in the junior ranks. Many are the injurious results of this. An officer is often quite unfit for service when promotion comes. From want of exercise the mind loses its powers, becomes torpid, and averse to apply itself to the due consideration of any subject which requires strong reasoning faculties, so that when he gets to the higher ranks, in many instances neither the state of his body or mind is fitted to the situation in which he is placed.

With very few exceptions the junior field

officers have been from twenty-five to thirty years in India, and the seniors from forty-five to fifty years, a period of time after which few, very few, men in any climate, but particularly in India, are capable of much exertion. Zeal for the service will often be found almost the only necessary quality the officers will retain, and blame is frequently attached to the individual, which a little more discrimination and closer examination of facts would have attributed to the real cause, an improper organization, that places it out of the power of the individual either to advance himself in the service, or to get out of it till long after he is unfit for it. And as long as this system is, as heretofore, undeviatingly adhered to, almost all the generals, colonels, and many of the field officers, will be found totally unfit for active field service.

In fact, a system of pure and undeviating seniority is continually attended with absurd and mischievous consequences. It does not call forth the talent which is in the service, and acting

upon the ridiculous idea, that every individual who has entered the army, and happened to live, is alike qualified to fill the upper ranks, puts the possessor of zeal and talent on the same footing with the imbecile and the indolent. A system that was not found to answer well, even for an army of fifty-five thousand, is quite out of the question for one of two hundred and eighty thousand. It results also, from this length of time required to arrive at the higher stations in the Company's service, that its officer is not only dreadfully superseded by His Majesty's officers, far his juniors in standing, a circumstance galling enough, but by the time he attains such rank, as in the common course of events would place him in a situation of important command, it is utterly impossible that he should fill it, if at all, in an efficient manner, certainly not for any considerable length of time. And these constant changes in the higher situations, are prejudicial to the public interests; for in no country or service in the world does the advancement

of the interest of the state depend more on the character and high reputation of its principal military servants, than it does in the Honourable Company's; besides it is a conspicuous trait in the native character, that they have no confidence in any man till they have known him for a considerable length of time in the exercise of power. If we look at it in another point of view, though it may appear trifling to a civilian to remark, a military man may be pardoned for observing, that it almost excludes the Honourable Company's officers from a participation in those high military honours, which the liberal spirit and feeling by which their sovereign is ever actuated, has held out to them. This is severely felt in the Bengal army at present, where some of the individuals, who, from long and brilliant services, have the strongest claims to the honours of the Order of the Bath, vacant by the death of other officers of the same presidency, and who possess the entire approbation of the government, are excluded for want of the prescribed rank of major-

general, although it is notorious that some among them* have served with great reputation, for very nearly half a century, during which time the territory and army have been increased in more than a four-fold ratio.

Thus while the government has been making the most rapid and gigantic strides in acquiring territory, its officers have, comparatively speaking, remained stationary as to rank†; and that entirely owing to the improper organization of 1796, and the plan of raising irregular corps. Many of the lieutenant-colonels have served upwards of forty-five years, so that if the present system should be continued, and nothing occur to quicken the promotion by His Majesty's general brevet, or by granting local rank, at some no very distant period (ten or twelve years), we may see an army of nearly three

* Colonel Adams for instance, who, I believe, has done more days and years of efficient duty with troops, than any other officer, either in the Indian or British army. Had he been in the latter, his services must have procured both high rank and honours for him, long before now.

† See Appendix E.

hundred thousand men without a single general officer belonging to it.

Lord Cornwallis's remarks in 1795, are still more applicable at present, "The Company's military arrangements have by no means kept pace with the gradual increase of their territories, and the consequent occasional augmentations of their establishments; and the defects in the constitution of the army, are now of a nature, that unless remedied they would soon render the officers in general no less discontented with their situation, than unfit for the discharge of the duties which may be necessary for the protection of the British interests in India."

"Under this system it will be obvious that the hopes of promotion and public distinction which operate beyond all other incitements in calling forth the exertions of military men, are in some measure withheld from the great body of the Company's officers; the present subalterns, and even the younger part of the captains of the Company's army, being naturally

impressed with every discouraging sensation which can arise from seeing no prospect of arriving at the rank of field officer, and still less at that of colonel, before they are superannuated and unfit for active service."

The officers are now, in 1826, much more backward in promotion, and have in every respect much worse prospects, than they had in 1796. In a word, this system is so much at variance with the regulations of His Majesty's service and British feeling, that it cannot possibly be continued much longer. To attempt it might be perhaps hazardous, for ambition is in its qualities as elastic and searching for an outlet as steam in its most condensed shape; and any power that attempts to keep it too closely confined, must, in point of duration, be extremely uncertain, not to dwell on the risk to be apprehended from an explosion.

I readily admit that in point of pecuniary remuneration no complaint can be made against the Company's service, and the liberality of the Honourable the Court of Directors has been often most conspicuously exerted; but money

is neither the proper reward, nor should it be made the chief stimulant, for exertion in an army. The officers in the Indian army would, I am confident, be satisfied with the present *reduced** allowances, if accompanied by steadier and more rapid promotion†. Rank, honours, and liberal retirement, are the real rewards for military men. As our army is at present managed, all these are so distant as to be almost hopeless. I could mention many, many instances of individuals, who giving up all idea of attaining them, have formed expensive habits and made connexions quite subversive of respectability‡, who would never have acted in

* The pay is actually reduced twenty-five per cent, in consequence of the depreciation of the currency. The rupee in which the Indian army is paid was a few years ago worth half-a-crown—it is now not worth two shillings.

† See Appendix F.

‡ I think that affording to the Company's officers the same facility as is afforded to the King's, of settling in Van Dieman's Land or New South Wales, would be felt as a great benefit by those officers who have families by Asiatic mothers. It would also act in a great measure to check the half-caste population, and be of incalculable benefit to those colonies, where the chief want is of men of moderate capitals, and the boon would be increased by allowing such officers to sell their pensions.

such a manner, if there existed a rational hope of acquiring high station, or of returning to their native land. The evils arising from this may be greater than at present contemplated. It should be inculcated on every young officer, that his stay in India is but temporary, and that he is to consider honour and respectability at home as the chief reward of his exertions. Protracted residence in India, which necessarily results from the present plan of promotion, is in general neither advantageous to the individual himself, or, speaking from observation, creditable to the national character.

I propose that promotion in the Indian army be regulated as in His Majesty's service. Let the regiments be made quite independent of one another, and officers allowed to rise by regimental seniority to the rank of lieutenant-colonel included ; besides the benefit this would be to the officers, it would be of great advantage to the service generally, for it would beget that reciprocal confidence between the European officer and the native soldier which forms the very

basis of our strength, and which cannot be acquired without long experience of one another. In any European regiment the officers and men composing it, being of the same country, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, sufficient confidence is acquired after a short knowledge of each other, so that little injury arises from changing them from corps to corps. But the feeling of the native soldier to his European officer is necessarily quite different, for whatever external cheerfulness or ready compliance he may shew to the orders of his superior, yet he has no great reliance on him till he has known him for some time, and that in the exercise of command. If their confidence be once gained it is easily secured, and if judiciously managed the conduct and exertion of the native soldiers will, under almost every variety of circumstance, be found such as to satisfy every reasonable expectation. At present a lieutenant-colonel cannot be said to belong properly to any one corps, and all chance of his cultivating this feeling is destroyed. I may

appeal to the service, if they ever knew of a regiment which deserved the character of being a good one when the commanding officer was often changed.

In this service great stress has been laid on the necessity for equality of promotion, which the uncertainty of human life alone renders perfectly impossible, more especially as it is neither a time; casualty, or seniority service, but part of each, which is worse than any. There are many instances of officers having been superseded by more than twelve years; as was the case with some of the cadets of 1783 by those of 1795, or more recently in the case of Lieutenant-colonel Patrickson, (of the Bengal establishment,) who has been superseded by about fifty lieutenant-colonels commandant, or lieutenant-colonels, which could scarcely have occurred if promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel inclusive had gone on in corps respectively; as in that case an officer so situated, might in some degree have recovered his rank; but by the present plan, supersession in ac-

quiring the rank of major can never be recovered.

Why two different plans should be adopted in services composed of individuals of the same nation, and drawn from the same classes of society as the King's and Company's are, I cannot conceive. Unless they be assimilated in this respect, they will never act harmoniously together. At present an officer in His Majesty's service may be said to rise to the rank of major in a period of from twelve to seventeen years— in the Company's service, it takes at least twenty-five to come to the same rank, This is occasioned principally by drafting officers into irregular corps, or for the general staff, and keeping them while doing such duty on the strength of the regiments of the line; and as if this were not delay sufficient, the regulation of 1798* comes into action, when they rise to be majors, and by stopping regimental promotion

* In this year the plan suggested by Lord Cornwallis in 1794 was finally adopted. Although the system of 1796 was partially in action, yet until 1798 majors were allowed to rise to the rank of lieutenant-colonel by regimental rank.

altogether and substituting for it, quite contrary to the practice in His Majesty's forces, line promotion, occasions a delay of some seven or eight years more. It is probable that this line promotion might not have acted so injuriously when the army was small; but now when there are no less than seventy-six majors of infantry in the Bengal service, the prospect of working up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel is discouraging enough to a new major after twenty-five years of service.

I am aware that Lord Cornwallis, to whom we are indebted for this latter regulation, imagined he was conferring a great obligation on the service by it, but like some other of his lordship's measures, it did injury to those whose interests he thought he was advancing. His reasons are given in his letter to Mr. Dundas of Nov. 7th, 1794, par. 37.

“ No distinction should, in my opinion, be made either in the promotion of officers, or in any other respect, between the Company's European troops that may be transferred to the

king's service, and those of the corresponding branches which at present compose His Majesty's army ; but some deviations from the rules that are sufficiently suitable to the European troops, will be necessary in the native branch of the service, particularly in regard to the promotion of officers, which I recommend to be made by regimental seniority to major, and then in the line at each presidency, because I conceive it to be improbable that the indulgence of a temporary leave of absence, which the officers of the native troops will enjoy in common with those of the European regiments, will afford them the same advantage of obtaining support from their connexions at home, as the others may derive from a more permanent residence near them, in consequence of the occasional reliefs of the European corps ; and I therefore think, that the officers whose services are unalterably fixed in so distant a quarter of the globe, ought to be protected by established regulations against the hazard of suffering by the abuse of patronage in any commander-in-chief."

These observations entirely rest upon the supposition that his plan of transferring the Company's army to the crown, and the frequency of reliefs of all the European corps employed in India would be adopted, and the officers in the native branch of the service thereby exposed to the hazard of being occasionally superseded by an improper exercise of power in the commander-in-chief. I confess that I never much entered into fears of such injustice, and it is less to be dreaded now, when no officer can be removed from the service, but by the sentence of a general court martial. But as the marquis's plan did not take place, it was rather hard that a provision which he only designed to be carried into execution in case another contingency should occur, is now in mischievous operation, although the contingency, against which it was intended to guard, has never happened.

I conclude this chapter, therefore, by observing, that the number of officers in the higher ranks should be generally increased.

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that junior officers should be rendered available much earlier than they are at present—that veteran corps of the kind which I have described, should be raised—that no drafts should be made on the regular corps either for the irregulars or permanent general staff situations without filling up their places—and that regimental promotion should, as in His Majesty's service, go on as far as the rank of lieutenant-colonel included. These regulations, all easy of execution, involving little expense, and no trouble, would tend to the efficiency of the service, and promote the interests and gratify the feelings of as meritorious a body of officers, as, I fear not to say, exists in the world.

STATEMENT shewing the number of **1796**, (the period when the present System was **and** how they were disposed of.

DESCRIPTION.	Remained in the Service on the 1st January, 1796, or have entered it between that Period and the 31st Dec 1820.	Retired to Europe on the Pension of their Rank after 22 Years' Service in India.	Died of Disease or killed in Action, or by Accident.	Proportion that those who have resigned bear to those who have retired from the Service.
Artillery	292	17	79	As 10 to 17
Engineers	69	4	21	As 5 to 4
Cavalry	208	11	70	As 13 to 11
Infantry	2,555	130	918	As 99 to 130
Medical	509	39	155	As 16 to 39
	3,633	201	1,243	

From the above it appears that out of all the **1796** retained in it in 1796, one in eighteen have retired on the pension. Rather more than one out of three have resigned. One out of twenty-six have resigned the service. One out of fifty-two have been invalided. One out of one hundred and fifty have been killed in action. One out of one hundred and seven have been killed by accident. **26** twenty-six Companions, in all thirty-four.

Amongst the Medical Men, there are Doctors
In the Medical Board, aggregate number
The Superintending Surgeons
The Surgeons
Assistant-Surgeons

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STATEMENT shewing the number of Officers, (the period when the present System was introduced and how they were disposed of.

DESCRIPTION.	Remained in the Service on the 1st January, 1796, or have entered it between that Period and the 31st Dec 1820.	Retired to Europe on the Pension of their Rank after 22 Years' Service in India.	Died of Disease or killed in Action, or by Accident.	Proportion that those who have resigned bear to those who have retired from the Service.
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Amongst the Medical Men, there are Doctors
 In the Medical Board, aggregate number
 The Superintending Surgeons
 The Surgeons
 Assistant-Surgeons

Number	1812		RANK.	Amt of Pence.	TOTAL.			
	1	2			£	s.	d.	
1	1	1	Colonel	0	1460	0	0	1460
2	1	1	Lieutenant-Colonel	5	191	5	0	191
1	1	1	Ditto	0	273	15	0	273
2	1	1	Ditto	0	73	0	0	73
1	1	1	Major	0	500	0	0	500
1	1	1	Ditto	0	182	10	0	182
25	3	1	Total in 1812	5	3162	12	6	3162
1	1	1	Head Surgeons	0	45	12	6	45
1	1	1	Members of Medical Board	0	86	10	0	86
1	1	1	Ditto	0	50	0	0	50
1	1	1	Surgeon	0	78	0	0	78
1	1	1	Ditto	0	182	10	0	182
1	1	1	365	0	365	0	0	365
1	1	1	261	5	261	5	0	261
1	1	1	£.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.

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Total in 1817			2080 10 0		
6	Lieutenant-Colonels	365 0 0	2190	0	0
1	Major	.	91	5	0
2	Captains	91 5 0	182	10	0
1	Ditto	.	121	5	0
1	Lieutenant	.	95	12	6
1	Ditto	.	45	12	6
1	Ditto	.	36	10	0
1	Head Surgeon	.	300	0	0
2	Surgeons	182 10 0	365	0	0
1	Ditto	.	91	5	0
17	Total in 1818	£	3519	0	0
2	Lieutenant-Colonels	365 0 0	730	0	0
1	Major	.	136	17	6
1	Ditto	.	91	5	0
1	Captain	.	191	5	0
8	Ditto	91 5 0	730	0	0
1	Ditto	.	70	12	6
1	Ditto	.	95	12	6
1	Ditto	.	45	12	6
1	Ditto	.	145	12	6
1	Lieutenant	.	173	0	0
2	Ditto	86 10 0	91	5	0
2	Ditto	45 12 6	36	10	0
1	Ditto	.	300	0	0
1	Head Surgeon	.	182	10	0
1	Surgeon	.	91	5	0
1	Ditto
25	Total in 1819	£	3111	7	6
1	Lieutenant-Colonel	.	182	10	0
1	Captain	.	211	5	0
8	Ditto	91 5 0	730	0	0
2	Ditto	45 12 6	91	5	0
2	Surgeons	182 10 0	365	0	0
1	Ditto	.	100	0	0
15	Total in 1820	£	1680	0	0

	Number	Total Amount in Pounds Sterling.		
		£.	s.	d.
.....	12	4132	10	0
.....	10	3246	5	0
.....	21	5475	0	0
.....	24	6059	0	0
.....	26	4279	12	6
.....	17	3225	10	6

CHAPTER II.

PREVIOUS to entering into any remarks on the plan of retirement as adopted in the Company's service, I present to the attention of my readers two tables, one shewing the number of officers that were in the Bengal army on the 1st January, 1796, or who entered it between that and 31st December, 1820, and how they have been disposed of; the other, the number of officers who have retired from all the presidencies up to 1820. (See Tables III. and IV.)

They cost me no small trouble and expense; but I shall repent neither, if they can be of any use to the service. I believe that their results have never been paralleled in any other army that ever existed.

Those statements will be found to present the most melancholy picture of a service that can possibly be imagined. I have endeavoured to make them strictly correct, and believe that

they are so. Should any part of them be found otherwise, the error is quite unintentional. It is not to be wondered at, when we consider the great variety of climate to which our officers are exposed in consequence of the increase of territory during the last thirty years—when, for instance, in the course of a few months, a man may be called on to serve in a flat and burning desert, exposed to hot and pestilential winds; then, amid frost and snow, on the elevated ranges of the highest mountains in the world, and afterwards in the dismal swamps of Aracan; that, for Bengal, so small a proportion as two hundred and one out of three thousand six hundred and thirty-three, about five per cent., should have retired to Europe on the pension of their rank after twenty-two years' service in India, and that the remaining ninety-five per cent. have either died, been killed, invalided in India, or resigned the service without any emolument from the Company, or remained in India for want of means of returning to Europe to retire. Such is a true picture of the

Bengal army, and an examination into the state of those of the other presidencies, would, I am certain, produce nearly similar results.

By the pension-list for the whole of the Indian army for the twenty-five years*, from the 1st January, 1796, and ending 1st December, 1820, it appears that out of all the officers and medical men, who had been in that service, only five hundred and fifty had come on the pension-list, out of which one hundred and eighty-one died before 1820, which reduced the number to three hundred and sixty-nine, and the aggregate of pensions to seventy-seven thousand one hundred and three pounds, averaging about two hundred pounds a year to each. The yearly increase of pensions appears to have averaged, during the whole twenty-

* I have chosen this period, because twenty-five years, furlough included, being the time that entitles an officer to retire, I wished to exhibit the results of the system of 1796, as they appeared at the conclusion of the first period in which they came in full action. Had the period from 1800 to 1825 been taken, I am inclined to believe that the results would have been more distressing.

five years, about six thousand pounds, and, instead of increasing, they have been less every year since 1812, owing to the reduction of the interest of money and unfavourable state of exchange between India and England. For the year 1820 it was only sixteen hundred and eighty pounds, a sum considerably less than the retiring pension of *one* of His Majesty's law officers from the supreme court in Bengal! When we take into consideration, that an empire, with ten times the extent of surface, and nearly six times the population of the British Isles, yielding a regularly-paid revenue of twenty-three millions of pounds sterling, has been added to Great Britain, will it be believed by posterity that such a work could possibly have been achieved at such a trifling pecuniary expense? *viz.*, a debt in 1820* not much exceeding half a year's revenue, which, when the pension-list of seventy-seven thousand one hundred and three pounds, to be reckoned at twelve or fifteen years' purchase, and any other super-

* Vide Mr. Tucker's work on *Indian Finance*.

annuations and pensions connected with the territory are added, would not altogether amount to one year's revenue. This, properly speaking, is the real price, if we may use the term, that that empire has cost in money up to 1820; what it has cost by the sacrifice of European lives is another matter, and this, although kept in the shade, forms the chief expense.

It is perfectly clear that whatever may be the advantages to Britain or India from the conquest, a very small portion of them has fallen to the lot of those by whose courage and zeal that conquest has been achieved*. Great, indeed, is the contrast between the financial burdens to which the revenues of India and England are exposed, in providing for those

* This is not only a hardship to the officers, but is losing sight of one of the great advantages England ought to derive from its occupation of India, namely, that of affording employment to a considerable number of individuals from the middling classes of society. The sum required to pay their pensions would form a direct tax on India, and the only fair one that can ever be imposed on it; but it would be *fair*, as the individuals receiving it had previously administered to the safety and general comfort of the population of India.

who have fought their battles. With reference to the retired full-pay and the half-pay lists of both up to 1820, it will be found the amount for the Honourable Company's service was only equal to about a two hundred and ninety-eighth part of the yearly revenue of India; while that of Great Britain for the army alone, was about a nineteenth part. In His Majesty's service, on the retired full-pay and half-pay, there are of one description or other about thirteen thousand officers, or about one hundred to each corps of the present establishment, *viz.*, four general officers, seven colonels or lieutenant-colonels, five majors, twenty-six captains, and upwards of fifty subalterns, or pay-masters, surgeons, and staff officers, exclusive of the officers on the strength of regiments; whereas for the Company's service there are but a fraction more than *one* retired officer for each corps of the present establishment, and the charge for sufficient allowances is attended with an *immense saving* to the Honourable Company.

However well inclined the officers may be, it would scarcely be reasonable or natural to

suppose that men possessing the qualities required by their profession, can remain satisfied or contented, under such sadly discouraging prospects as those before them.

In all other services it has been found necessary to hold out a hope amounting to a strong probability of a moderate proportion of the surviving officers being able to acquire some of those objects that have so powerful an effect on men's minds, such as high rank, honours, or emolument; how much more necessary must these inducements be in the Indian army, where the climate alone has such a debilitating effect on both body and mind, where the certain and unavoidable difficulties and hardships are so terribly over-proportioned to the possible advantages, and where individual exertion or acquirement is of no avail either in advancing the individual in rank, or accelerating his retirement?

Common humanity would seem to urge the discontinuance of such a system, even if it were not productive of results which, if not checked

in time, must seriously injure the character of the Indian army. I am quite convinced that nothing can be further from the wishes or intentions of the Honourable the Court of Directors, than that the survivors of those who had been so instrumental in the great work of winning so immense an empire, should be forgotten or compelled to spend their latter days in exile for want of the means of living in their native land, in a way to which their long, faithful, and important services so well entitle them.

CHAPTER III.

A CONTEMPLATION of such suffering as the preceding chapter exhibits, is but too certain an indication of what the country and the survivors have to expect if the same system be continued. And culpably passive indeed must be the character of the man who sees both the state and its servants so seriously injured, and never makes an attempt to discover the real source of the evil, nor aims at affording permanent and effectual relief, by suggesting a method for removing the efficient causes whence the mischief arises.

So urgent does the necessity for an alteration of part of the present system appear to me, that I think it my duty, merely on public grounds, to suggest it by all the means in my power. I have, therefore, brought the particulars of the case of the Indian army thus before the public, feeling that my sympathy for their situation, by which I am confident the Honour-

able the Court of Directors also will be influenced, when they view the correct details of such terrible havoc among those who have deserved so well of them, and their country, can be best, and most usefully displayed, by rendering, in a practical point of view, the sufferings of the dead, beneficial to the living, and to the service prospectively, by removing, as far as possible, the causes which have created that suffering.

In His Majesty's service, even in time of profound peace, it has been found necessary for the efficiency of the army, to allow a number of officers facilities to sell their commissions, or to go on half-pay with increased rank. In that service, these arrangements are managed, I believe, as well as possible ; but almost all the regulations connected with retirement from the Company's service need revision. They have a decided tendency to induce individuals to cling to the service to a period far beyond that at which the generality of men, even in a better climate than that of India, can be expected to be fit for the active duties of a military life.

Twenty-five years is generally considered to be the utmost average of efficient service there, and yet it would be found, on examination, that many officers in the Bengal army, under the rank of major-general, have served nearly double the period*. Every inducement should be held out to prevent the too general extension of this practice.

There are some parts of the present plan which admit of an easy and immediate improvement. For instance, by the present regulations, an officer who is entitled to retire, scarcely ever does so in India, but defers it until he has had three, four, or five years' leave of absence in Europe; so that it may be calculated on an average, that it is more than three years from the time that he leaves India, that it is known at the presidency to which he belongs, whether he has retired or not. This

* In all other armies there is generally a considerable period between the time when individuals are reckoned unfit for military duty, and that of their natural death; in this service there scarcely appears to be any such period, for whether fit or unfit, officers are kept on the strength of the army almost all their lives.

acts injuriously in two ways. It is prejudicial to the service that so many officers should be kept on the strength of corps, who in all probability will never rejoin them; and it is injurious to the officer who returns, by absorbing, in the shape of passage-money, so much of his hard-earned savings. In either case it is unfair to the junior officers who do the duty of the absentees without any additional emolument. As long as this practice is continued, a considerable proportion of the field officers and captains will unavoidably be employed in going backwards and forwards between India and England, in the vain expectation of renovating their broken constitutions; vain I may truly call it, for a very small proportion of the officers have anything like tolerable health after twenty-five years' residence in India. Indeed, there are many valuable servants whose health will not allow them to complete the prescribed period of service, and sick officers, I need not say, are only an encumbrance with an army. I have seen many instances of officers who had served twenty-five years, returning to India after

a furlough with health but little improved, and that little dearly bought by the sacrifice of the whole of the pecuniary advantages they had derived from the service.

I should propose, that when an officer has served the prescribed period and wishes to retire, means should be taken to induce him to declare his intention in India, and thereby to allow promotion to be filled up there at once. In this way a greater proportion of field officers and captains would be kept with the army, a want of whom is very often, under the present regulations, severely felt. I know that the system would not have been continued so long as it has been, but from an idea that it was productive of benefit to the officers, by allowing them the option of remaining in the service or not, and that it was attended with a saving to government by the difference between the Indian and the furlough allowance. The former of these suppositions is altogether a mistake, as it is *not* advantageous to the officers; and the latter is surely scarce worth attending to when

can be done without any loss to the service.

put in competition with the good of the service, and the claims on the liberality, or rather justice of the Company, which its military officers possess.

With respect to the expense which this alteration in the system might occasion, it is to be observed, that the first expense—*viz.*, the pensioning off the officers at once at the end of the twenty-five years instead of allowing them to extend that practically from three to five years longer, by delaying to send in their resignation under cover of their leave of absence—is too trifling to be at all considered, for what it would add to the pension list, it would take from the furlough allowance list. But we must be prepared, I admit, to meet another source of expense, which although more serious, ought to come from the officers themselves. To induce officers who have served twenty-five years, and attained perhaps the rank of major or captain, to give up all claim to higher rank, and declare their intention of so doing before leaving India, it is only to be expected that

they will look for an equivalent to the difference between the present pension, and the pension of the rank they might be enabled to attain by remaining a few years longer in the service, (when they might besides get the off-reckonings of a regiment,) and perhaps something more to compensate for what they might have saved from their allowances ; for in truth it is only when they rise to be field officers that the service affords its officers with corps, the opportunity of saving anything. The expense, however, will not be so great as might be anticipated, and not for a moment to be put in competition with the advantage which it would be of to the military interests of the Company, and the service. The chief difficulty that strikes me is as to the method of providing the fund.

No fund could be raised by money to be procured from the purchase of commissions, for in a climate and service where life is so uncertain, no prudent individual would (even allowing that he had the means,) be inclined to give a large sum for a step. Nor could it be raised

as in the civil service, by a *small* per centage, on the allowances of all the juniors, to take off a certain number of the seniors, as anything under five per cent. would have no perceptible effect in accelerating retirement in the military.

It must be considered that, although the military are about six times as numerous, the aggregate allowances of the civil and military services are nearly the same; for instance, the average allowance of a civil servant in Bengal, of twenty-six years' standing, is forty-eight thousand sicca * rupees; and the regimental allowance of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one captain, one first and one second lieutenant of artillery, or the corresponding ranks of engineers, European or native infantry, is altogether three thousand nine hundred and forty-five sonat rupees per month, or forty-seven thousand, nine hundred and forty sonat rupees per annum. So that it is evident from the great disparity of the emoluments of the two services, it could not be easily done in

* The sicca rupee is about four and three quarters per cent. more valuable than the sonat.

this way ; besides, the junior officers would not be inclined to contribute a part of their allowances for a purpose that could not, for a great length of time, be productive of any advantage to them. The officers, for example, below the rank of major, would not be inclined, under the present organization, to subscribe, in order to induce such of the lieutenant-colonels as wished to retire, to declare their intention in India.

The plan then which strikes me, after paying great attention to the subject, and consulting with officers of every rank in the service, as being efficacious for this most desirable purpose, is to establish a *Scale of Contributions*, on the different ranks in the service, for the formation of a fund to induce officers, who are entitled from their standing to retire, but to whom the pension is not a sufficient inducement for that purpose.

The details of the plan may be as follows :—

Let the majors be called on to contribute to a lieutenant-colonel about to retire, such a sum as would, with the present pension, amount to five hundred pounds per annum.

Let all officers under the rank of major be called on to contribute so much as would make the retiring pension of a major, now two hundred and ninety-two pounds per annum, the sum of four hundred pounds. The retirement of a major is the only one by which a step is given to all the officers in a corps, and by the present organization it is the rank at which promotion will stagnate excessively, particularly in the native infantry, where there is such a long list of majors; but if this proposal were adopted, it would more particularly be the rank at which most of the officers would retire. This plan would be attended with a saving to the government, of the difference between the pension of a major, and a lieutenant-colonel, and those who would remain in the service beyond the rank of major, would generally do so, in expectation of becoming colonels of regiments.

The annexed Table No. V. will shew the old and new rates of full pay, and the proposed additions at one view.

The sum to be given by the majors to induce such of the lieutenant-colonels as wish to retire,

Old Rate of Full

RANK.

Colonel
 Lieutenant-Colonel
 Member of Medical Board
 Major or Chaplain
 Superintending Surgeon
 Captain or Surgeon
 Lieutenant or Assistant Surgeon
 Ensign or Cornet

New

RANK.

Colonel
 Lieutenant-Colonel
 Member of Medical Board
 Major or Chaplain
 Superintending Surgeon
 Captain or Surgeon
 Lieutenant or Assistant Surgeon
 Ensign or Cornet

Inc

RANK.

Lieutenant-Colonel
 Major
 Captain
 Lieutenants
 Ensign



to do so in India, I would propose to be the same for every branch of the service, so as not to create any irregularity of promotion. I think even so small a sum as two thousand pounds would be found a sufficient inducement, and should be contributed as follows :—

The ten senior majors amongst them,		
one hundred and twenty-five pounds	£	125
Next ten, 15 <i>l.</i> each, or	.	150
Next ten, 20 <i>l.</i> each, or	.	200
Next ten, 25 <i>l.</i> each, or	.	250
Next ten, 30 <i>l.</i> each, or	.	300
Next ten, 35 <i>l.</i> each, or	.	350
Next ten, 40 <i>l.</i> each, or	.	400
Last five, 45 <i>l.</i> each, or	.	225
	£	<u>2000</u>

(Perhaps five or six would decline contributing.)

This is reckoning for the infantry on the Bengal establishment, and the process for the other branches of the service would be still more simple, particularly for the artillery, where the retirement of a lieutenant-colonel would give a step to the whole corps.

For a major who wishes to retire, I propose

a sum nearly equal to the difference of the allowances which the junior officers would get by obtaining the promotion three years sooner, or at the time he quitted India, which sum would be about two thousand pounds, and should be contributed as follows:—

First captain, the difference of allowances, taking the highest scale of allowances in the field, between captain and major for two years, or		£ 800
Second captain	.	200
Third ditto	.	150
Fourth ditto	.	100
Fifth ditto	.	80
First lieutenant, who would become captain, the difference of allowances for about fourteen months, or		200
Second lieutenant	.	70
Third ditto	.	65
Fourth ditto	.	60
Fifth ditto	.	55
Sixth ditto	.	50
Seventh ditto	.	45
Eighth ditto	.	40
Ninth ditto	.	35
Tenth ditto	.	30
Senior ensign the difference of allowances for ten months, or		50
		<u>£ 2030</u>

The officer retiring to have the option of taking the money, as some of those who have families and are in bad health would do, or an annuity, if the Honourable the Court of Directors will be pleased to grant it.

To prevent irregularity in promotion, all the corps should have the benefit of this plan in succession, according to the seniority of their majors, and where the major declined to retire, the senior captain should have the option of doing so, receiving the same sum from each junior officer as if a major had retired.

Thus the sums to be paid would fall chiefly on those getting a grade of rank, and even to them would be trifling compared with the advantage of getting rank so much sooner, because, by this means promotion and retirement would be accelerated about three or four years, chiefly at the expense of the officers in general.

Officers whose health will not allow them to remain in India to complete their twenty-two years' service, should receive the same sum from their juniors on retiring, as if they had

served the prescribed period ; in fact the step is worth more to the junior officers.

By this plan the Company's officers would not be so much superseded by the King's, and we should have more active officers in the higher ranks. Those who from bad health or other causes wish to retire, would have the means of doing so at the expiration of a more reasonable period, say twenty-five years, though even that is a much longer period than was proposed by Lord Cornwallis (*viz.*, twenty-six years for a lieutenant-colonel, twenty-four for a major, and eighteen for a captain). If officers retired with but small competencies, yet it would be at a time of life, when their habits and constitutions stood some chance of re-adapting themselves to the climate and customs of their native country ; and it is only probable that the officers who remained would be those out of the whole who were best calculated to fill the higher ranks with credit to themselves and advantage to the public interest. Those who retired would be the inefficient, either

from want of energy, zeal, or ability, and their retirement before they got into the higher ranks would be a true benefit to the service; in the lower, they cannot do much harm.

That a line might be drawn so as to distinguish the difference between those who had been compelled to retire from bad health, or wounds, and those, if any there are, who have not endeavoured to render themselves useful, the government would perhaps be pleased to take into consideration the expediency of marking its approbation, by giving the individuals, who had shewn zeal and ability, a grade of rank on retiring, which would not cost anything, and at the same time would be productive of very salutary effects to the service at large.

It should be understood to be quite optional with such officers as had served twenty-two years in India without a furlough, or twenty-five years with it, to retire, and I am of opinion that the proposed plan would not induce many to retire but such as are in bad health. There is no danger to be apprehended of its leading

the pension list much, as that is sufficiently protected by the long period of service required to entitle an officer to the benefit of it. Very few officers whose health will enable them to remain in India will retire on the pension of a lieutenant-colonel or major.

I trust I shall not be thought unreasonable or extravagant in proposing to add to the pension, so as to make it up to four or five hundred a year for those who have served upwards of twenty-two years in India, the majority of whom have nothing else to trust to. The principles of the plan either as to justice, utility, or humanity, can I trust be viewed in but one light, and if adopted will make many a gallant heart glow with gratitude, which at present is wrapped in despondency.

In preparing this plan, I have carefully avoided proposing any system for the military that could be attended with much expense to the Honourable Company, or indeed any expense beyond what is indispensably necessary for the efficiency of the service, and the pro-

tection of those who have passed almost all the useful part of their lives in it, from, as heretofore, adopting the sad alternative of remaining in perpetual exile, rather than be exposed to degradation, for want of the means of living like gentlemen in their native land.

I believe that circumstances of great and peculiar distress exist in the service, which have from false delicacy generally been concealed by those so situated ; but I feel that I would be unworthy of the good opinion of those with whom I have served so long, if I had not endeavoured to throw some light on this subject.

Without referring, however, to such cases (which are more numerous than is suspected), it would only be fair to those now in the service, that something should be done to give them a chance of promotion, for unless an alteration take place, officers of twenty years' standing, will, like the cadets of 1783, run no small hazard of being superseded by those who have entered the service ten years after them. Indeed, as it is, officers with that difference of standing are close

to each other now. This, among other defects, renders experience useless. Knowledge, in whatever time acquired, is almost always doubted when unsupported by rank, and in this service high rank and efficiency have hitherto been rarely united in one person.

Should the Honourable the Court of Directors be pleased to approve of the principles of this plan, there can be no difficulty in carrying it into effect, by notifying the outlines of it in its modified form in "general orders" at each presidency, where an officer ought to be appointed, say the adjutant-general, military secretary to government, or their deputies, or such other officer as the Honourable Court may deem most fit, to receive communications from such lieutenant-colonels as wish to avail themselves of the benefit of this plan. For a major, the process will be extremely simple, as the adjutant for his corps can be the agent to collect the required sum, and remit it at once to the general treasury, there to be held in trust for the officer retiring, and either to be paid over to him at

once, or, what would be far preferable, if the Honourable the Court of Directors will be pleased to sanction it, an annuity in its place. However, should there be any doubt, as to the practicability of the plan, or as to the trouble it would impose on the government, to put those doubts entirely to rest, nothing further would be required than for the government to notify in "general orders," that the Honourable the Court of Directors had determined, that the efficiency of the service required, that officers who wished to retire from it, should do so in India, instead of England, but that the Honourable Court, always taking a deep interest in whatever regards the good of its officers, has been induced to take off the present restriction that requires officers on retiring to declare, "that they have not received anything to induce them to do so," and that the Honourable Court has approved of a plan by which the junior officers are allowed to give the officers retiring a consideration of two thousand pounds as an indemnification for their giving up all

claim to higher rank ; the sum in all cases to be restricted to this : and that to prevent irregularity in promotion, corps shall only have the benefit of the plan according to the seniority of their majors, and allow the officers to make all the minor arrangements amongst themselves.

Although I have not said anything about a provision for the wives and children of officers, yet it has not escaped my notice, and could, I think, be best attended to in making the arrangements as to the disposal of the sum to be received by officers on retiring from the service. I have argued all along, and made my calculations on the supposition that the present organization is to be continued. If, as is before proposed, promotion in the Company's service be assimilated to the system in His Majesty's service, and the step of lieutenant-colonel be given in the regiment, the whole will be much simplified.

For the purpose of improving the condition of officers retiring, and, as far as practicable, to secure equalization of promotion (which, I

think, it would do more effectually than any other plan that can be devised), I beg to recommend that a fund be established in each regiment for the general good, to be called the "Retiring Fund," which, although one of its chief objects, should not prevent the accumulated capital from being intermediately employed, under proper management, in whatever way might be deemed most beneficial to the officers in general. In fact, it would become the family purse, from which those who required it could obtain temporary accommodation, and thereby preclude the necessity that at present exists of their being exposed to the ruinous consequences of occasionally borrowing money (for field equipment or other necessary purposes) at an usurious rate of interest, which has proved the ruin of so many, and compelled them to pass the remainder of their lives in exile. This, I think, might be avoided, and in attempting a remedy, no fear of reproach from those on whom it would impose trouble, will prevent me from strenuously urging its adop-

tion, merely from the idea that it would be productive of highly beneficial consequences to the service and all the officers in it.

This fund should be formed in each regiment by a subscription of five per cent. from the regimental monthly allowances of each officer, leaving out, for obvious reasons, the lieutenant-colonel commanding the corps, and commencing it with the major and downwards. I believe, after having made the calculations, that every fourth year the fund would accumulate to so much as to enable a corps to give two thousand pounds to the senior officer on retiring; if he refuse to do so, the next senior to have the option; should he refuse also, the next senior to be entitled to it.

To prevent irregularity in promotion, all the corps should have the benefit of this plan in succession, according to the seniority of their lieutenant-colonel or major. Even this advantage would not make up for the depreciation in the value of the currency in which the officers are paid; yet, if this system were adopted, the

recollection of past hardships would, in every generous breast, soon give way to the cheering prospect of improvement for the future, and the character of the service would, by the unanimity of those in it, be exalted. A firmly-established recipocrity of feeling and interest between the government and all its servants, would be the best security that England can have for the stability of the distant empire of India. This unity of feeling could not fail to be soon observed by the discerning natives in our armies, and by a little tact in introducing a method for rewarding, by employment in veteran and police corps, those natives whose past services in our armies entitle them to it, it is quite practicable to secure a much greater degree of confidence and allegiance from the whole, than at present exists; and that, without letting it at all appear to them that we either doubted their present feeling, or were anxious about the future. In short this system would, without expense to government, supply all the

efficiency that is wanting, and render all parties contented and cheerful.

Should this plan be adopted, I cannot sufficiently express the satisfaction it would afford me to have been instrumental in bringing about a change that is so much required, and would be productive of such incalculable advantages to the service prospectively. I trust it will not be imagined that I have framed it on any narrow principle, or in expectation of selfish benefit, but in common with the service at large; I hope this representation will be attributed to the true cause, a strong attachment to the service and those in it, and an ardent desire to see the efficiency of the one, and the condition of the other, improved as far as can be done without creating an improper expense to the Honourable Company.

CHAPTER IV.

As the period is drawing near when the renewal of the Honourable Company's charter will come to be discussed, every one connected with India, or who belongs to the Honourable Company's service, must take a deep interest in that subject. The most important question connected with it is, whether the Indian army is to be continued to the Honourable Company, or be transferred to the crown? A question of greater magnitude or one involving such serious results has never yet been decided by the British Legislaturē. It is not, as many people imagine, merely changing the name of this army by designating it the "King's," instead of the "Company's," for the most problematical part of the question remains: Is it practicable for the Honourable Company to retain the territory and civil government of India, and provide for the expense of an army, in regulating

the magnitude of which they should have no voice? To attempt that, appears to me just as azardous as for an individual to contract to pay the debts of another without knowing their amount. If that is declared impracticable, there will be but a choice of two alternatives left, either to continue the whole under certain modifications to the Company, or to transfer the whole territory, civil and military establishments connected with it, to the Crown. On a subject of such magnitude, I feel it would at this time be equally premature and presumptuous in me to offer any opinion, although I have perhaps looked as deeply into all the bearings of this complicated subject, as many of those who will give their opinions with the greatest confidence and in the most decided manner. Yet there are certain points on which, from my practical knowledge, I feel justified in offering some remarks, the more so as there are a variety of opinions respecting them.

The first is, whether it would be desirable to form the armies of all the different presidencies

in India into one, which is one of the supposed consequences of a transfer of the army to the crown, and what would be the advantages or disadvantages likely to arise from that measure? As to advantages I can scarcely discover any but what could be secured by much safer and less expensive expedients; as to disadvantages they are of the most serious nature, whether we consider them politically, or as affecting the interests of the European and native part of those armies.

There are disadvantages such as would induce me to pause and think well before recommending an avoidable change, which in its consequences, by seriously affecting the interests, would thereby violently agitate the feelings of the whole army both European and native, a measure that ought always to be guarded against. The expense too urges our taking a view of the finances of the state, not forgetting that the *permanent* settlement of the revenue in three of the most important provinces of the only presidency that has

hitherto ever paid its own expenses, is against the increase of the revenue ; while on the other hand it is quite clear the civil and military expenditure of that presidency must unavoidably be much increased by the late political arrangements with the states to the eastward of it. I am further satisfied, that if the civil and military establishments on the Bengal presidency were put on such a footing as its safe retention, with such protection to the persons and property of its very dense population, as it requires, such an alteration of allowances would necessarily take place as no longer to make it a desirable object for the other presidencies to amalgamate with it. If I do not egregiously deceive myself, the period is not far distant when it will be found necessary to alter the present system, not only by increasing the number of European civil and military servants in India, but rendering them more efficient, even if the accomplishment of that so highly necessary measure should require the reduction of the period of service, and scale of Indian

1. THEORY OF THE EARTH

2. THEORY OF THE EARTH

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19. THEORY OF THE EARTH

20. THEORY OF THE EARTH

itself ought to be a strong reason for keeping the armies of the different presidencies as distinct as possible. Again, if all our military force were formed into one army, and corps raised at one presidency sent to do duty at another, it would take the men such a distance from their native districts as to preclude the possibility of their getting the usual leave of absence to visit their families, without which indulgence, men of good caste would not con-

be composed in the proportion of one of the former to ten of the latter; as per annexed return of the castes of men in a corps raised at Benares in 1814-15, which corps was by no means well recruited.

TABLE, shewing the Caste of the Native-commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers and Sepoys of the second Battalion twenty-ninth Regiment, Native Infantry.

RANKS.	MUSSULMEN.				HINDOOS.									
	Shah.	Synd.	Moghul.	Patan.	Bramin.	Rajpoot.	Koli.	Burja	Aheir.	Bhant.	Koormee.	Aceit.	Moone.	Total.
Subadars . .	1			1		4	2	1	1					10
Jemadars . .	3			6	2	4	1							16
Havildars . .	5			6	15	19	2		1	1	1			50
Naicks . .	4			6	2	12	2	1		1				50
Sepoys . .	19			41	351	265	16	32	32	7	4	2	3	740

tinue to enter our service. It would, besides, be attended with enormous expense, by making it necessary to raise the pay of the native part of the Bengal army to the same scale as the Madras, which on account of the difference of the price of labour and provisions is necessarily high. It would take the patronage for Madras and Bombay almost entirely from the governor and commander-in-chief of those presidencies, and throw it into the hands of the governor-general and commander-in-chief in India, and instead of being of service to the officers of the Madras and Bombay presidencies by allowing them to be on the staff in Bengal, the probabilities are, that it would have quite a contrary effect, and that those presidencies would be inundated with staff officers from Bengal. Fort William must continue to be the general place of residence of both the governor-general and commander-in-chief, who would naturally give a preference to men whom they had an opportunity of seeing and inquiring minutely about, to strangers they had never seen, or of whom

they could not, without much delay, acquire a sufficient knowledge.

After deliberately and attentively examining and considering all the bearings of this important and complicated subject, I am fully persuaded that the forming of the armies of the three presidencies into one army, would, in its general results, divest us of those advantages we at present possess, by keeping them so distinct, as, for obvious reasons, infinitely to increase the stability of the empire. An amalgamation so far from doing good, would, I am confident, produce consequences beyond all moderate comparison more injurious than those, the removal of which seems to me to be the chief object for urging it, *viz.*, the difference of pay and allowances.

The formation of the whole into one army, would be attended with almost insurmountable difficulties in adjusting the rank, prospects, and claims, of the European officers, and the pay of the native part of the army, and create such confusion and endless dissensions as are at pre-

sent unthought of, and all for the attainment of an object that may easily be accomplished without it. Before coming to any decision on this head, it would be but just and proper to take a general view of the present state and distribution of the whole of the Company's army, with reference to the numerical strength of the force both regular and irregular, and the number of European officers required for its establishments at each presidency; and after that has been fairly investigated, and it has been determined which presidency stands most in need of an increase of troops, then it will be high time to frame and adopt some comprehensive plan calculated to render that stupendous empire more compact than it now is. That can only be done by a more judicious division of it into presidencies, and a subdivision of them into military districts, so as that the force in them could, at all times, in case of necessity, support each other; and also to avail ourselves as far as possible of every advantage afforded by the nature of the country, the num-

ber and character of its population, the resources, character, and feeling of the adjoining states towards our government, and to determine what description and extent of military force is best adapted to each district, and adequate to the safe retention of the whole. This does not appear of late years to have been sufficiently attended to, for those parts that are most valuable, and most exposed to danger, are, by far, worst protected, as is the case with the Bengal presidency, which, for its whole length, is on one side (the north) exposed to the inroads of the most warlike states in all India.

The form, boundaries, nature, and extent of our possessions on the continent of India, the magnitude, great discrepancy of the population and resources of its different parts, would, in a political and military point of view, seem strongly to urge that it should be formed into two grand divisions, that of the south and north. The Madras and Bombay armies to occupy all the territory to the southward of twenty, north latitude, and the Bombay army,

the territory along the coast to the Gulph of Cutch, and towards the central parts of India, till it reached a point equidistant from Bombay, and the head quarters of the northern division of the Bengal army ; (or this might be regulated according to the disposable means of each presidency*, and whether its frontier would be strengthened by extending its military stations in that direction,)—all the territory to the north and east of these districts to be occupied by the Bengal army.

The territory now occupied by the Madras and Bombay armies, is so interspersed, as to render a fresh line of demarcation necessary between them.

The Bengal presidency has attained to such a vast extent, as to render it, with the seat of government where it is, indispensably necessary to divide it, or, at any rate, its army, into two divisions, those of Bengal and Hindostan.

Allahabad, for the general purpose, presents

* Particularly as to their capabilities for furnishing recruits.

itself as being, in almost every point of view, the most proper place for the head quarters of the army of Hindostan, but great advantage would arise to the efficiency of the army, and general tranquillity of the country, if its head quarters were made moveable to Agra, or elsewhere, as circumstances might require.

From the great superiority for military purposes, and facilities of procuring men for the army in the northern provinces, the most effective and formidable part of all the Indian army would be that of Hindostan; and from Allahabad or Agra, to all the most important parts of the empire, troops could be marched in sufficient force, and in so much shorter time than at present, as incalculably to increase the military strength of the British government in India*.

The Bengal presidency could be judiciously divided from the Madras presidency, and its northern could be separated from its southern portion by running a line from the southern point of the Chilka Lake to Allahabad, and from

* See Appendix G.

thence north to Catmandoo in Nepaul, and from Allahabad to the southward and westward, till it reached a point equidistant from Allahabad and Bombay.

The other division of the Bengal presidency might be by the line of the Sone River and River Gunduck, from Rotasgur to Catmandoo. The division of the Bengal presidency is not only necessary to render it more compact*, and for many other political reasons, but to prevent the great discontent and annoyance its present size occasions to the army in effecting the periodical reliefs of troops, and in enabling the natives in the service to visit their families. Besides this, the natives of our northern provinces dread the climate of Bengal as much as Europeans do, and the desertions are usually very numerous when a corps is ordered to that province.

For the purpose of getting rid of any discon-

* Suppose a mutiny, such as that at Barrackpore had broken out in Rohilcund, or any other place far from the seat of government, what would have been the probable consequences ?

tent arising from the inequality of the pay and allowances of the troops of the different presidencies where they come in collision with each other, in the central parts of India, there is a very simple remedy, *viz.*, from a central point, where the different armies close in, draw a circle with a diameter of a hundred or one hundred and fifty miles, the allowances of all the troops coming within that circle to be exactly the same, without reference to which army they belong; this would at once and for ever hush all those representations about the inequality of allowances occasioned by the collision, and beyond that, it is totally unconnected with the subject of which I treat. The plan I have proposed, would, I believe, place the occupation of military stations on very nearly the same footing as they were in 1823.

By this means the whole native army would be nearly equally divided between the coast army and that of the north, and in case of necessity, the European force would make the

scale preponderate quickly either way, a measure that ought never to be lost sight of.

I cannot close my remarks on this head, without repeating my full conviction of the political necessity for keeping the native armies of the coast and the north as distinct as possible, for the habits of life and physical strength of the natives of the different parts of the Company's territory are more discordant than those of the inhabitants of almost any two countries in Europe, and I am certain it is not practicable to employ, without injury to the interests of the state and feelings of individuals, one mode of management all over India; if it should ever be attempted, the truth of this assertion will probably be discovered when it is too late to rectify the mistake.

The employment of officers belonging to one presidency at another, unless under very particular circumstances, ought to be avoided.

The transfer of officers from one of the Indian armies to another, would, for numerous and substantial reasons, be establishing a precedent

from which might spring the most seriously injurious results to the prospects of individuals, and general harmony of the service.

As to an exchange between officers of the King's and Company's services, it is, under almost any circumstances, totally out of the question.

As I consider any further details, either as to the division of the territory, or of the Bengal army, superfluous, I am satisfied at present with throwing out the hint, and strongly recommending its adoption, whether the army is to be in the hands of the Company or the Crown.

One thing, however, is very evident, that the two armies now in India, the King's and Company's, never will act harmoniously together, as long as one system is followed for promotion in one, and another in the other. I should respectfully press the consideration on the Honourable the Court of Directors, that the defects in the organization of their army which I have already so fully pointed out, might be no inefficient argument in the hands of His Majesty's

ministers to propose the union of the services, under the direct control of the crown. *They* must see how the two different systems act, and can appreciate the merits and demerits of both. It is, however, not too late for the Court of Directors to prevent this argument being used, and to put their army on such a footing as not to give any ground for saying, that in their hands it was ill administered or ineffectual.

CHAPTER V.

IN page 16, I proposed that veteran regiments should be formed for reasons there given. It is no wish of mine that, when formed, they should be unemployed. In a country with so dense, uneducated, and immoral a population as that of India, after providing for the efficiency of the army, by which it is to be protected from all great external and internal dangers, an object of vast importance to its general tranquillity must be that of establishing and keeping up an efficient police*, which of itself would, by suppressing crime, be of such consequence as ought to point out the necessity of forming it into a distinct department, with such organization as

* There is nothing new in the idea of employing natives, who have been in our armies for police purposes, in India, for it has been talked of for the last twenty years; yet, although the Court of Directors sent out orders eight years ago to try to carry it into effect, I am not aware of any specific plan (till now) having been framed for its adoption.

to ensure the accomplishment of the objects for which it is intended. After much investigation of the manner in which the police is managed by the civil servants in India, I am of opinion that it could be made much more efficient by giving it a military organization, and selecting veteran soldiers, with a proper code to regulate them for the execution of its duties.

The effect of our code of military law on the natives of India is so conspicuously beneficial, as to be a strong inducement for us to extend it further, as it almost entirely changes their habits, and corrects that part of their conduct in which they are most apt to go wrong. The contrast between two native brothers, educated in the same way, becomes, after the one has been a sepoy, and the other employed in civil situations for a short time, as great as possibly can be. The sepoy fulfils every reasonable hope we can expect from him, whilst in the other we are as generally disappointed, and the reason is very obvious, for while the sepoy's good conduct entitles him to reward, bad con-

duct makes him fully as certain of punishment ; the other has little prospect of preferment, and is seldom or ever subjected to severe punishment. Being fully convinced that any system so seriously affecting the safety of the persons and property of so large a proportion of our native subjects is one of such importance as to render it highly worthy of being brought to the notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors, I recommend that an experiment should be tried (on a small scale) as to whether natives, who had been employed in our armies, can, in a manner advantageous to the state and its subjects, be employed in police purposes. Its success would, in some degree, depend on the judgment exercised in framing a code of regulations applicable to the desired purpose, the proper selection of individuals for that duty, but most of all on the vigilance, zeal, and ability of the officer selected for carrying the plan into effect. Although the result of all experiments must, in some degree, be uncertain, I do not anticipate that this will not succeed ; and

my opinion is founded on the grounds that we are reasonably entitled to expect more from men who have maintained fair reputation in our armies, been accustomed to discipline, and have something to lose both in the shape of character and pension, than from men whose characters or fitness had not, in one case out of a great many, undergone the necessary ordeal of investigation by some judicious European functionary. At present a great proportion of the Darogas, Jemadars, and inferior persons employed in the police establishments, must be nominated by the judge and magistrate of a district, at the recommendation of the natives employed about him, without any knowledge on his part of the fitness of the individual for the situation to which he is appointed.

I propose that from each veteran regiment a supplementary company, to be called the "Staff Company," should be formed of the veterans, who, on examination, were found fittest for this duty; that when a vacancy occurred in the police establishment, the judge

and magistrate should send a requisition to the officer commanding the veteran corps to furnish an individual from among the veterans for that employment. To enable him to make the proper selection, the magistrate should acquaint him with the name of the village, the extent and description of its population. The individual, when approved of, should be appointed by the judge and magistrate, by whose authority only he should be removed in case of misconduct; but instead of being tried in the civil court, he should be tried by a court-martial composed of veteran native officers under an European superintending officer, with such evidence as the judge and magistrate might order to be sent against him, and the individual to be dealt with according as the code of regulations may prescribe for the nature of the offence.

There is no room to dread that the veteran officers composing the courts-martial, by which delinquents should be tried, will be too lenient, as a desire to continue a system affording advantages to the native part of the army would

make them anxious to support it by example. By this means we should combine the advantages of trial similar to that by jury, and of military discipline for the support of our civil and police establishments.

I have no hesitation in obtruding it as my opinion, that if ever the experiment of introducing "trial by jury," with native jurors is to be made, it ought at any rate to commence in this way.

With the means we have at command, by a judicious arrangement as to regulations, tact in the selection of individuals, both European and native, and energy on their part, so efficient a military police could be formed as in a few years would render the country so tranquil that a person might travel without an escort from Calcutta to Delhi, without dread of injury, either to his person or property. At present without an escort I am sorry to say there is no safety for either.

I would not deem it expedient to appoint any native officer to the head of the police

establishment in his own native town or village for fear of partiality. If this system were introduced the judge and magistrate of a district would be relieved from a vast deal of vexatious duty respecting inferior police affairs, and be enabled to employ the time that has hitherto been occupied by them in more important objects.

A man who had been in the army would be more formidable in a police situation and less likely to be tampered with by thieves and robbers than a simple villager ; he could beside more coolly and methodically call in the necessary aid to suppress any trifling tumult or disorder ; and in case of anything of magnitude occurring, he would be the proper person to rely on for correct information respecting it, and it ought to be his duty to communicate such information at the earliest possible period to the civil and military power under which he was placed ; neglect on his part to be visited with removal from his situation, and such other further punishment as the nature of the case

on investigation might require. By this means the constituted authorities would have such early intimation of any real or intended extensive local commotion, as to be enabled to suppress it before it attained to any formidable extent.

If the proposed system should be found to answer it could be easily extended, so as to have the whole of the police all over India of this description ; but in the first instance the experimental police should be placed under the officer in charge of the veteran corps from which the individuals were selected for that duty.

The success of the plan would render it necessary to take care that zeal and ability, and not interest, should be the test of the qualifications of the officer to be appointed to this duty ; the younger he is in the service, the more time he will have before him to bring this important plan to maturity, and it is an easy matter to ensure compliance with his orders, either by not appointing any officer senior to

him to the department, or by giving him official rank, the same as is done in other departments of the general staff.

Should this police system succeed, as in all probability it would even beyond our most sanguine expectations, then the extension of it would require an officer of the rank of captain or lieutenant for conducting it in each district. It ought to be his duty to visit periodically all the different posts in his district, a monthly or quarterly report of the state of which he should furnish to the magistrate, and likewise to the officer under whose guidance and direction the whole of the police should be placed. This officer might be designated, "superintendent" or "adjutant-general of police," and have a deputy, the one to be stationed in the lower, and the other in the upper, provinces of the Bengal establishment; and those officers ought to go the tour of their districts at least once a year, for the purpose of correcting abuses, and collecting information to be laid before the Nizamut Adaulut, or such other tribu-

nal as government might think most fit. With a small increase to our regular force, and an efficient military police, I am quite confident that we might, with a vast saving of expense and increased safety to the country, dispense with the services of at least fifteen thousand of our irregular troops in Bengal alone.

Use could be made of the veteran corps in the collection of revenue and the general performance of provincial duties. As the native part of these corps would consist chiefly of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, with but a few sepoys, it would perform the two-fold purpose of bestowing a boon on the deserving veterans, and of providing a superior description of corps for such purposes, as well as save the expense by invaliding; for the veterans should form the frame-work for all the provincial corps, in the shape of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. As soon as that is done, a sufficient number of such sepoys of the present provincial corps as are eligible should be embodied with the veterans for the general per-

formance of provincial duties. All promotion for commissioned or non-commissioned officers who had not previously been in the regular service should cease from that date, and all such vacancies should be supplied from among the veterans. Those who were displaced by them should receive a small pecuniary consideration equal to one or two months' pay, and be discharged agreeably to the terms on which they entered the service.

Four officers properly qualified should be selected from the line for the duty of each veteran corps of this new organization, and that of the depôt which it is intended it should have attached to it. Under the same commanding officers it might be made to furnish recruits for ten corps of the line; the officer commanding to be a major or captain, the other three lieutenants, one to act as adjutant to the veteran corps, and one as adjutant to the depôt corps; their duties to be separate, but both to be under the officer commanding the veteran corps, as should be the other subaltern, who

should act as interpreter and quarter-master to both.

The veterans to receive half batta and in other respects the same allowances as similar ranks in the line do when in cantonments; all the provincials* the same allowances as at present.

The highly important measure of recruiting for the native army, has not hitherto been generally conducted in such a manner as the efficiency and character of the army requires. It has usually been put off till the exigences of the service rendered it necessary to raise a great many men in a very short time, which not only compelled the recruiting officers to take men that at other times would have been rejected, but also the government to pay a bounty for recruits. This ought to be strictly guarded against, for if the natives ever discover that they can get a bounty, there will soon be no recruits to be had without it, and the yearly

* It has been customary to stop promotion in those corps in time of peace, but that was of no use to regiments of the line.

expense for those required to fill up vacancies in an army of such magnitude would be enormous. This might easily be avoided, and a much superior description of recruits obtained, by having such a number of regular regiments as when complete, would be sufficient for any exigency that could occur ; in time of peace their strength might be allowed to fall so low as seventy privates a company—and when the aspect of public affairs required an increase to the regular army, it should be made by augmenting the strength, and not the number of regular regiments as has usually been done—and that in such a hurried manner too, as often to be very ill performed. The formation of veteran corps, as before proposed, with a dépôt for recruits attached to each, would, in time of war, be the best plan to ensure a regular supply of disciplined men, whether to fill up vacancies, or for an augmentation of the army, as thereafter no recruits should be entertained for provincial corps, but such as were fit for, and agreed to serve in the corps of the line whenever and

wherever required, whether temporarily* or permanently, thereby affording time to officers commanding corps, to judge of their fitness. Commanding officers should also have the power (under proper restrictions) of sending to provincial corps, such men as were found unfit for the line, yet had not served so long as to be entitled to the advantages held out to veterans; these men to receive only the same pay as the provincial sepoys do, and no promotion. This would be a most powerful stimulant to exertion and good conduct in the line, so much so, that in two or three years it would be entirely the fault of commanding officers if there was a single man in a corps of the line who was unfit for it†. The success of this plan would chiefly depend on the zeal and ability of the officers in command of the veteran corps, and in charge

* With this proviso, that men who had been in action with the enemy or served twelve months in a corps of the line, should not, without a fault, be returned to a provincial corps.

† At present more than a tenth part of each regiment are quite unfit for active service.

of the recruiting dépôt attached to them, and, perhaps, the fairest probability of a proper selection of officers for that purpose would be afforded, by allowing the commanding officer of each regiment of the line to send to headquarters, the name of the officer in his corps that he deemed most fit for the dépôt corps, and these officers might be changed every two or three years, so as to allow a participation in this employ to the officers of every corps, which would create emulation amongst the junior officers in attaining the necessary qualifications.

However the chief object I have in view is, by this alteration, gradually to get clear of that fallacious short-sighted system of keeping up irregular corps of the present organization, and in place of it, to introduce a system with all its advantages (which are only as to the difference of the pay of the native part of them), besides a great many advantages it does not present, and none of the disadvantages which the present irregular corps are so fraught with; for instead of being, as I propose, all

irregular corps should be in future, a nursery for the army as to recruits, an honourable receptacle for the veteran soldier*, or a certain part of each of those corps might be composed of such men as were unfit for the line (those men to be formed into separate companies), on whom should fall those provincial duties, such as attending convicts and the like, which duties I would not propose should be performed by the young sepoy intended for the line.

I have no hesitation in saying that irregular corps are more frequently a nursery for vice, and a temporary receptacle for persons, who, when deprived of that species of employment, but too frequently tend to swell the lists of offences in the adjoining districts. I am satisfied that a great deal of mischief and depredation of every sort might be traced as arising out of this mistaken system, for every one knows, that in any country, common soldiers,

* And those employed for police purposes would be the most proper persons through whom the sepoy might send their savings to their families.

released from restraints, are for a time very little, if at all, superior to emancipated slaves. In India, from the difficulty of detecting them, they are frequently much worse; in short, it would be difficult to devise a plan so much calculated to keep the country infested with loose and disorderly characters as the present one, of so frequently employing and then discharging a great many thousands of men, a large proportion of whom, not having any other avocation to resort to for their livelihood, are, on the reduction of their corps, from necessity compelled to turn thieves—and in India, from its vast extent, the nature of the country and climate, greater facilities are afforded to banditti for carrying on their nefarious practices, than in any other country.

It is painful to think of the great number of travellers and sepoys (when on leave of absence to visit their families), that each year are murdered. It is not long ago since a man was hanged in one of the northern provinces, who confessed that he had been aiding and assist-

ing at the murder of no less than nineteen people, in the short space of twenty-one days, many of whom were sepoys. It is revolting to human nature to think of the atrocities that are still committed on the persons of travellers on public roads, as is but too fully established by the number of dead bodies to be found in the wells in some parts of the country, and this can only be prevented by removing the causes as far as possible, and by a vigilant police.

If these suggestions were adopted, the efficiency of corps of the line, both European* and native, the general staff, and all the different establishments connected with the army, would be wonderfully improved, the internal police incalculably better managed, the military aid required for revenue and provincial duties performed by a superior class of persons, and that without costing a single rupee additional.

* As there should be one veteran corps of Europeans and one of dismounted native cavalry for Bengal, the men of the latter might be employed about the Honourable Company's breeding studs.

CHAPTER VI.

I CANNOT conclude without saying a few words in behalf of the native soldier. Although it does not fall strictly within my design, yet, from long knowledge of their good qualities, I am so highly interested for them that I should feel happy if any observation of mine could tend to do them any service. I am, besides, perfectly convinced that our hold on India principally depends on their attachment to our government. If we secure their allegiance we need not fear the invasion of any foreign enemy, no matter how great may be his resources, or dread the danger of domestic insurrection, from whatever class of the population arising—without it, our tenure of Hindostan is not worth three years' purchase.

Notwithstanding the readiness with which they enter our service, I do not think that the natives in general are much pleased with our

sway. Luckily, however, for the permanence of our power, patriotism is entirely unknown among them, and its place is occupied by love of their kindred, their religion, and money. On these feelings we ought to work, by paying them liberally, providing for the comforts of their families, and taking especial care not to allow their faith to be insulted by any persons. Kind deportment and attention to their wants are sure to attach them, and experience has taught us that it has generally been some act of individual kindness on the part of European officers that has led to the discovery of the most dangerous plots against us; such as the mutiny at Java, the insurrection of the Paishwa, and many others, which those conversant with the annals of our Indian empire will immediately recollect.

I am happy to say, that the discipline of the army is generally administered in the mildest manner; in some regiments corporal punishment has not been inflicted for three years together. Yet I recommend that it should be

entirely abolished, and that the lash should disappear altogether from the native armies of India. I do not make this recommendation on theoretical, but the most practical grounds ; I know that there is no necessity for it ; that it needlessly degrades individuals, and hurts the feelings of the population.

In the British army the discontinuance of flogging has been recommended, but principally, if not exclusively, by men not acquainted with the service. The military men who have spoken or written on the subject are generally of opinion that discipline cannot be kept up without it. Into this controversy I have no desire to intrude, but there is such a difference between the habits and the composition of the two armies, that those who might wish the retention of corporal punishment in the British, might most consistently desire its abolition in the Indian. The only defence for the practice at all is its necessity for ensuring discipline. I am certain no military man wishes for the power on any other grounds, and that every

officer would desire to see it abolished if possible. If I can shew that in the Indian army it is not necessary for this purpose, I cannot anticipate any argument in its defence.

The crimes which by the practice of the British service are punished by flogging, are principally insubordination, drunkenness, theft, and other breaches of military duty. Drunkenness, I believe, and its consequences, are those which oftenest bring the soldier to the halberts. Now, in the Bengal army, drunkenness is unknown; the religion of both Hindoo and Mussulman prohibits it much more effectually than any military laws we could make. In that patient population, trained for ages to unmurmuring obedience to despotic authority, insubordination is scarcely ever heard of. Insolent language is a thing totally out of the question—its existence would appear as a miracle. In reality, the deference which even the native officer pays to his European superior—sometimes a lad young enough to be his grandson—is not to be paralleled out of the East. As for

theft, a regulation exists in the Company's army, that a thief, once detected, is *immediately* turned out of it, and nothing can equal the disgrace that attaches to him. What remains, then, an object of punishment but trifling breaches of military duty? and these ought not to be visited by flogging. When carried to the highest, such as desertion before an enemy, or mutiny, they are punished (and very properly punished) with death; when on a minor scale, they should not be treated with the punishment of infamy. In nine cases out of ten, the blame far more properly attaches to the officers, for in a regiment where the system is good, the commanding officer vigilant and firm, the staff attentive, the captains and subalterns active in their surveillance over the men, and all shewing them good example, a breach of discipline seldom occurs. When such things happen, extra duties, or removal from a regular to a provincial corps with reduced pay and no promotion, and, last of all, hard labour, will much more effectually prevent their recurrence than flogging. In-

deed hard labour is more dreaded by a Hindoo than death itself; it is a positive suffering in such a climate, and death being, according to their predestinarian creed, appointed to happen at a period fixed from their creation, for every individual, they care little as to the manner in which it comes.

Flogging in every service, unless it is rendered so common as to lose whatever good effects it may be supposed to have, degrades the individual. In the Bengal service this is more especially the case; most of the native soldiers are men of high caste—many of the highest. I have known regiments, nearly half of the rank and file of which were Brahmins. Now punishing those men before men of lower caste, degrades them beyond any European conception. The corporal pain inflicted by the lash is nothing to it: it should, therefore, never be inflicted for such offences as mere unintentional forgetfulness of duty; and, as I have already mentioned, the Bengal soldier is scarcely ever guilty of any other military crime.

Without looking to their religious ideas of rank, the Bengal* soldier is drawn from a superior class to that which usually furnishes recruits for the British army. Many of them are the sons of men of landed property or large farmers, a considerable number of them are men of some property themselves. For such men flogging is not the proper punishment; in fact, I never knew it have the effect of making a bad man become a good one. I have too often known the contrary. If any man be irreclaimable, let him be got rid of: there will not be any want of a person to fill his place. This is a remedy which would be too costly for the English army, and that affords another ground of difference between the two services.

It could at all events be tried for some time, or be introduced gradually. Let the commanding officer of any regiment in which a fault deserving of corporal punishment has not

* The bulk of the men in the other armies of India being of a different description, may probably require as much difference of treatment.

occurred for a year, have the privilege of proclaiming its abolition for the ensuing three years. Some external mark should be made to point out the alteration of the system—such as giving the drummers, who no longer would be executioners, the uniform of the regiment*, and altering their jackets from yellow to red. The very sight of this would occasion such an emulation throughout all the other regiments, that I venture to say that before three years there would not be a yellow jacket to be seen. How great would be the advantages resulting from this are too obvious to need enumeration.

The present time is the fittest possible for proclaiming the abolition of flogging†. The conquest of Ava, the storming of Bhurtpore, the complete pacification of all India, afford honourable reasons for granting a boon to the native army, and this would be felt as a

* Or the drummer of the company in which a man was punished, might be made to wear a *red feather*.

† On the Bengal establishment, where men are so easily to be had without any bounty, no man who required to be flogged should be retained in the service.

great one. It would tend also to mitigate angry feelings connected with a late, if *necessary*, yet severe visitation on some of its mutinous members, and would much augment the popularity of the Company. As the natives are great observers of particular periods, some appropriate day should be selected for the purpose, and I should recommend one connected with the political or military history of our dominions in India. The day, for instance, on which the Company obtained from the emperor the confirmation of territorial possession, which, as applicable to all the presidencies, would, perhaps, be the most proper that could be selected, particularly as, by happy coincidence, it happens to be the 12th of August, the birth-day of His Most Gracious Majesty, whose age, sixty-five in next August, will thus correspond with the most important era of the British in India*. Those who are acquainted with the superstitious feelings of the Hindoos, will know how to calculate what effect this coin-

* The acquisition of the duannee, 12th August, 1765.

cidence would have upon their minds. It would come with a double grace on that day which gave them to the dominion of the most equitable government, as, in spite of whatever defects it may be chargeable with, it certainly is, that has ruled them at least since the days of their Hindoo princes—and which is also the birth-day of that king, under whom the empire has been consolidated by the prostration of every hostile Asiatic power on the Continent of India south of the Indus; while simultaneously every belligerent European banner was broke, and the British flag unfurled over every place of any importance from the Cape of Good Hope to New Holland; and the triumph of His Majesty's armies in all quarters of the world are neither unknown or unappreciated by them. If it were to be proclaimed that the abolition of what they consider a severe oppression should take place on the 12th of August next, it would do much towards begetting a kindly feeling on their part to the British nation, who they should be taught to respect and revere, not by threats

of punishment, or mere nugatory professions of kindness, but through the justice, liberality, and mildness of its rule over them as a dependent state. On the other hand, the ultra zeal of the missionaries must be restrained and not allowed to take undue advantage of the circumstance, for it would be the height of insanity to permit any attempt to be made to thrust our religion on them; and our native troops would assuredly prefer the continuation of any system of punishment, which, afflicting their bodies only, would leave the care of their souls to themselves. In my opinion there can be no more effectual method needed for unfolding the beauties of the Christian religion to them, than whilst although despising it, yet they should be made to feel (and that in their own persons too) its benign influence through the magnanimous acts of those professing it, by whom they have been conquered, are governed, and held in subjection.

CONCLUSION.

I HAVE thus endeavoured to press on the attention of my readers, what I consider as the chief practical remedies for evils, the existence of which is not denied by any one acquainted with India. They may be thus recapitulated:—

1. The army should be more numerously officered in its higher ranks.
2. Junior officers should be sooner employed than they are.
3. The system of irregular corps should be checked.
4. Officers on the general staff should not be allowed to remain on the strength of regiments.
5. Regimental promotion should be allowed to go on as far as the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and the Honourable Company have the right of promoting to Colonel, as before 1806.
6. Veteran regiments should be raised, and officered from the general staff, and made avail-

able for all the purposes of internal police, provincial duties, and recruiting for the line.

7. A fund should be made to induce officers to retire earlier than they would be inclined to do under the present system, and to declare their intention of doing so in India.

8. A new distribution of the troops in the different presidencies, and a new division of the presidencies themselves, should be adopted.

9. Officers should get grants of land in New South Wales, and be allowed to sell their pensions *on their own lives*.

10. Brevet rank should be granted for distinguished services.

11. Local rank should be conferred on officers of very long standing in the service.

12. Corporal punishment ought to be abolished in the native army of Bengal.

Such are my propositions: it will be for others to decide whether they are or are not to be acted on. Yet, that *something* should be done, will, I am sure, be admitted by those

who will take the trouble of looking over the table opposite page 37, and find there, on the unquestioned faith of public returns, that in twenty-five years, ninety-five out of every hundred officers, men who entered the service in the days of boyhood, died by a premature death, or remained in exile. If this or any considerable portion of it is attributable to, as I contend, a vicious system, it is high time that that system should be changed—and if change be resolved upon, the sooner it is put into execution the better. The instrument by which we govern India, should not be neglected or mismanaged for a moment.

APPENDIX.

A.

ALTHOUGH I am neither disposed to make unnecessary comments, or pass unmerited eulogiums on a class of men, already so well known, as our native troops are, yet from the importance of their service, and a kindly feeling engendered by having shared both danger and distress with those men, I cannot repress the strong desire, or let slip this opportunity, of doing justice to the character of the native soldier, by bestowing my humble meed of praise, and expressing my most unqualified admiration of their general good and gallant conduct in every variety of situation in which I have seen them placed, some of which were sufficiently trying.

Wherever they have been led by commanders worthy of their confidence, the success that has resulted from their attack, or defence of fortified places, or in field actions on the continent of India, or elsewhere, has placed beyond all doubt their qualities as to courage and perseverance; whilst as often as they have been required to serve beyond sea, they have readily and cheerfully evinced the utmost zeal for the service, and a strong love of fame, by exposing themselves to privations, such, as from personal observation, I am convinced no other class of men could have been induced to do; for on these occasions their religious and

other prejudices that are interwoven with their very nature and existence, have all been rendered subservient to the public interest, in a manner that could not fail to make a deep and lasting impression on every European officer of any judgment or observation, who accompanied them in those expeditions. Nothing can ever obliterate from my mind the strong impression made on it by the conduct of some of our native soldiers in 1811, whose high sense of duty to the state overcame all the strongest ties and bonds of human nature, and many of those men who on former occasions had almost denied themselves the necessaries of life to provide for their families, and performed wonderfully long journeys* in incredibly short time to convey their savings to their homes, on that occasion, when in progress to embark for Java, passed close by the houses of their families and nearest relations without going to see them, least the prejudice of their friends at their going aboard ship, should induce them to desert their standards; a circumstance which exalts the character of a sepoy, and offers an example worthy of imitation by the soldiers of all other countries.

This self possession and denial was not their only good quality, for even after their physical strength had been much reduced by the mode of living they imposed on themselves, (their religious prejudices preventing them from cooking on board ship) having used scarcely anything but dry grain and bad water, for three or four months aboard ship, their spirits remained un-

* A distance of two thousand miles on foot in the short period of five months, a large portion of which was passed at their homes.

broken. Their general conduct was conspicuously good, as appears by the following order by the Governor-general in Council, at Fort William, the 11th of February, 1812, when Lord Minto, who was not in the habit of bestowing unmerited praise on the military, said, "that he did not fear the reproach of partial exaggeration in saying that greater glory never was acquired by the same number of men, in the same short space of time, than was by the army serving in Java; and his lordship cannot omit from the seat of his more immediate authority, congratulating the army of Bengal on the distinguished honour which has fallen on the native troops of this presidency, serving on Java, opposed as they have rarely been to an European enemy, they attracted the unanimous applause of the whole army, by steady as well as ardent valour displayed in the most trying scenes of war." And there were instances of great individual bravery, the mention of two of which shall suffice: that of Buhadur Khan, (quite a lad, a sepoy, in the left grenadier company of the sixth volunteer battalion,) who the first action he was ever engaged in bayoneted ten of the enemy, French, Dutch, and Malays. The other was of a Hindoo sepoy of the same corps, who when attacked by eight armed Malays, shot one, bayoneted three, and took the other four prisoners, and carried them along with him; neither of these men were stouter in appearance than other sepoys. With such materials to fill our ranks, and to such an extent as they could be furnished from the

Bengal presidency alone*, provided they are staunch in their allegiance what have we to dread from external hostility? With the almost inexhaustible means as to men, and with the other resources of India, if our native army is properly recruited, organized, disciplined, and commanded, and the whole judiciously directed, even if we should be threatened with the greatest external hostility that could possibly befall us, such as a Russian army in full march from the Caspian to Hindostan, and simultaneously a French force a second time bending its course through Egypt for the Malabar coast—even in this case with the additional temporary aid of thirty or forty thousand British troops, we should certainly be enabled advantageously and fairly to meet at those points any force that those countries could send against us. But in that event, I fear seniority either in the council or field, would scarcely be able to retain its place. On the contrary, it must yield to effi-

* The provinces forming what is called the Bengal presidency, leaving out the province of Bengal, and taking in that of Oude, (now a kingdom), could, in case of necessity, furnish upwards of a million of men, possessing sufficient physical strength and all the other requisite qualities to make excellent soldiers.

From long and close observation of the men in the native infantry on the Bengal establishment, I am confident that to the extent of at least three hundred thousand, might easily be found with fully as much bodily strength, as the generality of Europeans have in that climate; being predestinarians, the Asiatics have little fear of death, and as they are perfectly obedient to orders, it rests entirely with their officers as to what they can accomplish; it must be allowed that with a good military system, there is in India the finest materials for privates, and the widest and best field for making able officers of any in the world.

ciency, the army must be new modelled, and weeded of its inefficient members; when that was done, our coast army with its usual gallantry, strengthened by an additional European force, would beyond doubt be able to repel any French force; and if the progress of the Russian army could not be arrested before it reached our frontier on the Jumna, even if our native troops were not actuated by any more martial feeling than the dread of the consequences to their families in case of their failure, I am fully persuaded *that* would have so powerful an effect on their minds as to rouse them to attempt anything possible for men to perform; and should the fate of India, for a third time come to be determined on the "Plains of Paniput", those who know our troops would have no reason to dread the result.

The mere contemplation however of such events must cause some uneasiness. Any attempt of the kind might create such a panic in this country, among those ignorant of the capabilities of the Indian army, as to cast many obstacles in the way of our success. Great as that risk would be, we have a much more serious danger, and one more certain in its effects to guard against, in the hazard we are constantly exposed to, by any diminution of the allegiance of our native troops, to which, if we may judge from the little pains taken to strengthen the bonds that connect them with their European officers, and the whole with the government, we may fairly infer such consideration or importance is not attached as ought to be. On the contrary, their compliance with our rule hitherto has lulled us into an

imaginary security of a very shallow and culpable nature ; one neither supported by precedent in any other state, or grounded on anything so substantial as to induce any to acquiesce in the belief of its propriety, but such as are either destitute of observation, or too indolent to investigate the existing facts and evils, and to devise remedies for the latter. For on what principle, or for what reason can the natives in our armies be supposed to have any strong attachment to our government, beyond what regards their own immediate convenience and necessities ? The advantages to themselves, (and there are almost none to their families,) either in point of rank or emolument are very limited, and for the last twenty years, their condition so far from improving has been rendered much worse, by their being now constantly exposed to great expense in procuring, or privation for want of, proper carriage for those things indispensably necessary to them on long marches, owing to the overgrown size of some of the presidencies. From that one cause such great discontent has arisen as ought to render it a matter worthy of the immediate consideration of government, for although it is highly proper to protect the peasantry in India from oppression from our troops when marching, yet it is still more urgently necessary, that the wants of those who protect the government and the country at large, should be supplied in such a manner as to prevent any just cause for discontent or distress. Without much improvement in this respect a regular supply of men fit for the army, and celerity of movement of our troops never can be ensured. If I do

not deceive myself, the arrangement proposed p. 86 &c. for employing men who have been in our armies, for police purposes, would be productive of great good, and under proper management that department should be made to supply the necessary carriage for troops when marching, which would at once check any irregularity on the part of the troops, without magnifying it in the way that is generally done to the civil authorities by those placed under them, who themselves frequently commit that very crime of which they accuse others.

B.

It must be quite evident, that in a service where there is no sale of commissions allowed, or scarcely any egress but by deaths, and a constant ingress of officers, there must necessarily be much individual suffering and many inefficient members.

On this subject I had prepared a good many remarks illustrated by particular cases, some of which might, perhaps, astonish those who hear so much of the wealth of India, and the excellent internal management of its army, but on further reflection I suppress them, because I have no desire to hurt the feelings of any individual, by exposing either their distresses or deficiencies. My readers, however, may without such detail draw their own conclusions from the general fact laid before them.

C.

FROM long experience and minute observation, I am convinced the plan of sending cadets intended for native corps, in the first instance to do duty with an European corps, is a bad one, as it creates prejudices not easily got rid of; at the same time it is highly desirable they should in some degree be made acquainted with their duty before joining the corps, to which they are to be permanently attached, and thereby prevent injury to the discipline of a regiment, by having several of its companies commanded by inexperienced officers, or the feelings of those officers being wounded by seeing native officers placed in command of companies on parade when they were not so. There is very seldom an European officer to each company, and generally speaking, ensigns on joining native corps are required to perform almost all the duties performed by captains of companies in European regiments which of itself ought to be a strong reason for promoting officers sooner to the rank of captain than has hitherto been done. Seven years ought to be enough for subaltern, whereas seventeen has been the average period.

D.

It is to be regretted that in all discussions about the service, the Company's officers in general have showed more anxiety about money than rank, which I am convinced, is upon the whole a mistaken idea, as rank is not only the most proper, but with its usual accompaniments, in the end the most substantial reward for either long or distinguished services.

Every reasonable man must allow that the Honourable Company are liberal paymasters, but very sparing of their rank, which would be of less consequence were the Company's army not brought in contact with His Majesty's, in which rank is attainable in various ways besides long service: and discontent will be one of the results of awakening ambition, where the means of satisfying it, by the acquirement of rank or distinction, does not in some degree exist. By bestowing increased rank for distinguished service, the individual would be kept in his proper line; whereas by the present plan of giving a civil appointment as a reward, it is neither so congenial to the feelings of a man of enterprise, nor are his future services of such importance to the interests of the state, as if he had been retained in his proper place. For instance, how inadequate was the reward of a paymastership to Captain now Major Fitzgerald of the Bengal cavalry for his highly distinguished, indeed we

may say heroic, achievement with a part of the Bengal sixth cavalry, against an overwhelming number of the enemy at Seetabuldie in 1817?. As an example and incitement, it is to be wished he should yet have brevet rank, or something more substantial, conferred on him for that important piece of service, as should all officers in the Honourable Company's army, who particularly distinguish themselves when employed on actual service. This would elevate the regimental officer, and place him more nearly on a footing with the staff, and be attended with highly beneficial results to the service at large.

Several of the king's officers got brevet rank for their services at Bhurtpore, while at the same place several of the Company's officers performed similar services, and although with the loss of limbs, yet no such thing as increased rank was bestowed on them. I am satisfied that the granting of brevet* rank under proper restrictions would do great good, for stimulants are very necessary in every army, but particularly in this. The Company's officers are dealt with as if they had no ambition nor feeling at all.

On purpose to encourage and keep up a spirit for enterprise amongst officers, the good of the service requires that some mark of favour should be bestowed on those officers who have volunteered for and suffered in their health by serving in unhealthy situations; this could easily be done in a way that would be very agreeable to the service, and not be attended with any expense to the Company, viz., by allowing a furlough to

* As it might be granted so as not to interfere with the claims of other officers, for off-reckonings, or with regimental rank.

Europe, to such officers whose health required it, without deducting the time so employed from the period of service. This might have retrospective effect. It would tend to keep the service more efficient, for the effects of a protracted campaign or warfare in India, are invariably numerous casualties, and much sickness amongst European officers so employed, particularly on the eastern islands, or the late theatre of operations in the Burmah territory.

The more general establishment of regimental messes in native corps, would, I am convinced, be attended with numerous and substantial advantages to the whole service, but particularly to the junior officers. At present there are very few regimental messes amongst the native corps on the Bengal establishment, and there are many reasons for this; such as the great chance of an officer being detached with part of a corps, and the smallness of their number not admitting of any part of the mess establishment being detached with it. But the most important reason is, that commandants of regiments being constantly liable to be removed, are on that account compelled to keep such an establishment, as to be at all times perfectly independent of a mess; and a mess formed entirely of the junior officers in any service, could scarcely be expected to be conducted in a manner likely to inculcate either subordination, good order, or economy. This could easily be remedied by allowing officers to rise in one corps to the rank of lieutenant-colonel inclusive; and the formation of a mess in every corps, would, I am confident add much to the efficiency of the service and comfort

of individuals. For although I believe it may be truly said that no man has ever accomplished much of importance without having been a good deal by himself, yet solitary habits have a very contrary effect on weak minds, as may be discovered by an examination of the career of many of those unfortunate individuals who have been transferred to the pension establishment. With a well-regulated mess, the respectability and general tone of society in a corps would be improved, all the good part of European habits retained, and the bad part of Asiatic ones be avoided. With a regimental mess, and the aid of a regimental fund, after the first few years, all the officers might keep clear of debt, and when entitled to it, those whose health required it would be enabled to take their furlough to Europe. This almost all require, yet very few can afford even after ten or fifteen years' service.

E.

RANK is not only the most proper reward for military service, but is essentially necessary to enable officers in high command to keep up discipline and subordination. The rank of the senior officers of this service (particularly on the Bengal establishment where they are at least ten years more backward than at the other presidencies), is quite incompatible with their length of service, or the importance of the duties they have to perform, some of the colonels and lieutenant-colonels having done the duty of general officers for more than ten years. This would seem to urge the propriety of their situation being represented in the proper quarter, with a recommendation that higher rank should be bestowed on them, either by a special brevet for that purpose, or by granting local rank according to the length * of service and qualifications.

If I have not formed an erroneous idea of the feeling by which our present sovereign is constantly actuated, I imagine the case of the senior officers of the Indian army would admit of a representation; especially as it

* Which might be fifteen years to captain, twenty years to major, twenty-five years to lieutenant-colonel, thirty years to colonel, and thirty-five years to major-general, for those now of long standing in the service; if such length of service does not entitle them to this rank, the sooner they get out of it, so much the better for themselves.

would afford His Majesty an additional opportunity for evincing that liberality of sentiment for which he has ever been so conspicuous, and has been graciously pleased to display to the officers of this service, by convincing them that their services were viewed by His Majesty in the same light as those of the officers in His Majesty's own more immediate service.

F.

As to the equalization of allowances of all classes of military servants at all the presidencies, it would no doubt be very desirable if the state of the revenue could afford it, and it could be done without taking away anything that at present exists ; but retrenchment in India should not be resorted to if at all avoidable. Considerable relief, however, could be given in this way by paying them all in a currency of the same value, which could be most easily effected by having a rupee struck of the value of the present sonat rupee ; this would not make any difference to the Bengal army, and would improve the allowances of the civil and military servants at Bombay and Madras, and would not be much felt by the Bengal civil servants, particularly now that they have got so liberal a retiring fund, in framing which, several of my suggestions were adopted. And for the same reasons I adduced when I recommended it, I deem a retiring fund ten times more necessary for the army, particularly when we take into consideration that the officers of the army have suffered equally by the depreciation of the currency in which they are paid, and unfavourable exchanges, and also that the system of 1796 did not admit of their obtaining rank commensurate with their length of service, or importance of the duties they have performed. For if only five per cent. of the officers retired when the off-reck-

onings of regiments were nearly double what they are now, the interest of money so high as to allow their savings to accumulate rapidly, when the intrinsic value of the currency in which they were paid, and exchange with England were fully twenty-five per cent. better than at present, and the army more than quadrupled during their period of service, (a thing that cannot occur again,) what are the reasonable prospects of the officers now in the service?

G.

THE extent of the Bengal territory is inconveniently great. From Fort William to the extreme points of the presidency, the distance is from twelve to thirteen hundred miles. The communication by Dawks occupies a month—it would take an army four months at least, to march from the head-quarters to the extreme frontier. So that the distance from our Indian metropolis to its remote dependencies is, for military purposes, almost as great as from England to India. The inconveniencies hence arising are very great, and in case of hostile operations*, the distance from head-quarters might be of immense consequence. A provincial government in some more central part of the territory is evidently required. A tribunal more equally distant from all points, would be of great advantage in the administration of justice, checking local abuses, &c., and as for expense, it would rather be a saving than otherwise, because it would spare the necessity of employing so many detached functionaries scattered about the country. Nothing can be of more importance to the tranquillity and good government of the country, in a civil or military point of view, than the proximity of a superior authority, which would be able to provide for any con-

* By (Russia) the only European power that can ever attempt to molest us in that quarter (the North of India).

tingency and repress misuse of inferior power, whether accidental or designed. It would much simplify the business of the governor-general and the council, who would thus have but one board to correspond with, instead of being obliged to manage such distant districts, by keeping up a correspondence with magistrates spread over a vast extent of country, very often on points of trivial importance, which cannot be well arranged at a distance. One adequate local board in the part of India referred to in the text, would fully answer every purpose that could be required, it would take in the districts gained since 1817, and if further conquests are to be made in that direction, it would serve to manage them also. It is no small recommendation to it in my mind, that by making such an arrangement no part of the present patronage would be disturbed, nor anything of importance that at present exists, in the slightest degree be deranged.

Allahabad or Agra are to be preferred for such a seat of government not merely from their central situation, but because they have communication by water at all seasons of the year with Calcutta.

ADDENDA.

ALTHOUGH in the body of this work I have not deemed it expedient to exercise the reader's patience, by dragging him through all the uninteresting detail of events connected with the Indian army from its earliest formation, yet it may not be altogether unacceptable to some of my readers to have, in this place, a few of the principal circumstances and changes pointed out, chiefly as relating to the Bengal army. Until the year 1757, the East India Company's military force in Bengal amounted only to a few artillery-men, and a very few companies of European infantry, for the protection of their trade. Early in that year the first corps of sepoy was formed in Bengal; and as changes ever since have constantly been taking place in the constitution of our native army, I think it proper to state the manner in which that corps was organized.

It had three European officers, who acted as mounted officers; it had a native commandant, who, either on parade, or in action with the enemy, took post beside the European commanding officer: there was also a native adjutant to each corps. Every company had a subadar, three jemadars, five havildars, one of whom was a colour havildar, four naicks and seventy sepoy, with a stand of colours, and some native musicians, to each company.

That corps which formed the basis of the present first regiment of Bengal native infantry, was at the battle of Plassey the same year it was raised ; and seven years after that, twenty-eight men belonging to it were blown away from the mouths of cannon, by order of Major, afterwards Sir Hector Munro, for a mutiny, which was supposed to have been instigated by two Frenchmen who had been admitted into the British service.

After a careful investigation of the conduct of the native troops in the Bengal side of India, from that time up to the present period, I am happy to be able to say that I have not discovered a single instance of their having shewn insubordination, or any disposition to mutiny, unless when improperly treated, and even then but very rarely ; and what must appear still more strange, when any disposition to mutiny has occurred, it has always been at head-quarters, and generally from a dread of being required to go on board ship. That dread was heightened by the circumstance of two companies of sepoy of the third battalion having been lost at sea in returning from Madras, in 1769. Since then great and successful exertions have been made to overcome their prejudices to sea voyages ; yet I am of opinion that high caste Hindoos, from not cooking on board ship, suffer so much, that it would be better, perhaps, to select Mahomedans for that duty. From the first formation of the Bengal army, up to the present time, there has been but one solitary instance of any native belonging to it having offered violence to a European officer, and that occurred by a man who had been reduced from a havildar to a sepoy, shooting the

commanding officer of his corps, when in front of it, exercising the regiment, which so exasperated the native officers and sepoys, that they cut him to pieces on the spot.

In 1764, there were nineteen battalions of sepoys. In 1765, when the Company obtained territorial possession from the Emperor Shah Allum, the experiment of provincial corps was first tried, and nearly the whole of those then raised, were, a few years afterwards, reduced for misconduct. In 1773, there were six European officers allowed to each battalion, and drums and fifes were substituted for native music. From that time till 1781, no material change took place, when the whole was formed into regiments of two battalions, with five hundred men to each, with a major to command each regiment, a captain to command each battalion, and one European officer to each company, all of whom were generally present; and as there were no drafts on corps for officers at that time, they were then, forty-five years ago, more fully officered than they are at present; and there were at that time in Bengal forty-two battalions of sepoys. In 1786, the whole were formed into regiments of one battalion, with ten companies to each. In the same year corps were reduced to eight companies, which give an increase of six to the number of regiments. In that year the Court of Directors expressed their dissatisfaction at such high rank as major being conferred on the officer commanding a regiment, or the rank of captain to the officer commanding a battalion, as they thought the duty could be as well done by a captain and lieutenant. In 1786, an important change

also took place as regarded the native officers, who, for the first time, got commissions signed by the commander-in-chief; until that year they only had warrants signed by the officer commanding the brigade to which they belonged; and there used to be eight or nine battalions in a brigade. About the same time a serjeant-major and quarter-master serjeant (Europeans) were added to each native corps; and, strange as it may appear, up to the present period the most important point connected with their duty has never been sufficiently defined. And it is of such importance, that I cannot pass it over without a few remarks, the more particularly as there are a variety of opinions on the subject, *viz.*, as to whether a native officer, who has a commission, of which he can only be deprived by the sentence of government, the commander-in-chief, or a general court-martial, shall be obliged to report to, or receive orders from a European, who has no commission, or written authority, authorizing him to command native officers.

Further, in case it should so happen that all the European officers with a native corps were to fall, who should take the command of that corps, whether a native officer who has a commission as subadar-major, or a European with the rank of serjeant-major. On this subject officers are a good deal divided in opinion, according as they are partial to the European or native character, and duty is carried on variously. In some regiments the native officers are made to receive orders from the European serjeants, and in others they are not.

If it is intended that the serjeants attached to native corps are to command the native officers, they ought to

be furnished with warrants empowering them to do so. If it is not intended that they should be invested with that authority, it is certainly improper to degrade the native officers, as is often done by making them report to a man holding inferior rank to themselves, merely because he is a European. This matter ought to be attended to, as it has sometimes been productive of very serious consequences, and created discontent among the native officers, as in the case of a jemadar who was the chief instigator of the mutiny on Java, with the intent to get himself appointed to the command of the island. A dispute with, and refusal on his part to obey a serjeant-major some years before, led to his being dismissed from the service ; however he was afterwards reinstated by order of the Court of Directors. And although he behaved very gallantly on several subsequent occasions, yet the real or imaginary degradation he had received at the hands of a serjeant-major, rankled in his mind, and urged him on to his diabolical attempt. In 1791, camp equipage was first allowed to the Bengal troops. Although an abstract had been in use since 1781, yet the whole of the British articles of war were not translated into the native languages, and generally applied for the preservation of subordination and support of discipline in the Indian army till 1795 ; ever since they have been attended to, the same as in His Majesty's army.

For several years great discontent had been manifested by the Company's officers, arising out of the hardships they were exposed to, in 1794-5. Deputies were sent to England by them to represent their situa-

tion to His Majesty's Ministers, and the Court of Directors, which, after a great deal of discussion, (in which Lord Cornwallis's views and plans appear to have been most valued,) ended in the adoption of the system of 1796, the effects of which I have, in the body of this work, had occasion to elucidate so fully. Even this system was not agreed to by Lord Cornwallis, till after he had exhausted all his influence to obtain a transfer of the Company's army to the Crown, allowing the Company to retain the territory and civil government of India as theretofore, a measure that I hold to be perfectly impracticable, as the affairs of the territory and army are now so interwoven and dependent on each other, that at the present time the man who would propose to place them in separate hands, can have taken only a very superficial view of this highly important affair, all the principal bearings of which it is my intention to develop in a subsequent work, before that question shall become the subject of parliamentary discussion.

Lord Cornwallis would appear to have laboured under constant apprehension of the danger likely to arise from British subjects being allowed to colonise in India, as is clearly demonstrated by his recommendation that every military man, in whatever way employed in India, should be kept on the strength of a regiment, whether he should ever join it or not ; and, consequently, I believe there are instances of men (it would be a misnomer to call them officers) having risen to high rank, and got the off-reckonings of regiments, without almost ever having done any duty with one. Besides this there

were other great defects in the system of 1796, as regarded the European officers, by making it almost impossible for any of them to attain such rank as to entitle them to high command, and the evils of that system were aggravated by not making the increase of the regular army, keep pace with the increase of territory, which Lord Cornwallis certainly expected would have been done. Nothing can tend more to colonisation, than the continuance of a system that compels those in the service to remain in India all their lives.

Although this system has left the Indian army very few efficient officers above the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and a great many worn out even below it, candour compels me to declare that it has been productive of some very beneficial results in the internal management of our native regiments, by entirely abolishing peculation, and placing the responsibility in the hands of the European instead of the native officers, and by causing such constant intercourse between the sepoys and their European officers, as affords ample opportunity to the latter not only to become acquainted with the language, customs, and prejudices, but with the individual characters of their men, thereby giving them the most complete control over them, which is generally exercised with great discretion and mutual satisfaction.

While the prospects and emoluments to the European officers have gradually become worse, the pay has remained much the same to the native part of the army, nor is it necessary to increase it to them, unless in certain situations, where the prices of provisions are extremely high, and they are put to great extra expense

for carriage; in such situations the interest of the state requires that some extra allowance ought to be made.

From 1796 till 1806, during which ten years the basis was laid for giving that stability to the Indian empire which was consummated in 1823, by an observance of the same system by Lord Hastings, no considerable alterations took place in the constitution of this army; but in 1806, an arrangement was effected between the Court of Directors and the Horse-Guards, the injurious consequences of which, I am confident, could not at the time have been anticipated, or otherwise it would not have been desired by the illustrious and distinguished personage at the head of the British army, or willingly acceded to by the Court of Directors, as the representatives of the Indian army. As the advancement of the public interest on the basis of justice must have been the feeling by which they were actuated in adopting a change, that, if the war in Europe had continued, and frequent brevets had taken place in the British army, would not have been so much felt; but as it is, it has been attended with fatal consequences to the prospects of the officers in the Indian army, by restricting promotion by the Company to that of lieutenant-colonel, instead of colonel, as was the case up to that period. Unless this is altered, the Indian army will very soon be without any officer of higher rank than that of lieutenant-colonel belonging to it, and despondency must inevitably take the place of that spirit of ambition so essentially necessary to maintain the character of the British arms in the East.

From 1806 to 1813, as is usual in India in time

of peace with the native states, the affairs of the Bengal army were much neglected and indifferently administered.

From 1813 to 1823, although extensive warlike operations were successfully carried on during that period, yet but very few material alterations or improvements were introduced into the army till the end of the latter year, when the authorities in England made a most important change in the organization of the whole of the Indian army, by making each battalion a regiment, and regiments independent of each other, and giving the same number of officers to each regiment of cavalry and infantry, or battalion of artillery. Although this benefited some classes of officers at the expense of others, whose expected off-reckonings were diminished one half by it, yet, as it expedited the rise of the whole, it did, in that respect, great good; while on the other hand, it created a sensation in the Indian army by so generally separating the European officers from their men, by means of which the mutual knowledge of individual character was entirely lost, to the great prejudice of the public interest, and not without considerable dissatisfaction both to the European and native part of the army.

I may, perhaps, be suspected of partiality to the Indian army, in some of the observations which I have made; but I have said nothing in its favour with which every one who knows it will not agree. All its com-

manders from Clive to Lord Hastings, have been lavish in their encomiums ; and I cannot better conclude than by the flattering testimony contained in the parting general orders of one of the most distinguished characters in the history of British India—Lord Lake—than whom no individual ever existed who had seen it better tried, or was more capable of appreciating it.

“ The Right Honourable Lord Lake having taken his departure from Fort William for the purpose of returning to Europe, feels himself now called upon to perform the last act of public duty in his situation of commander-in-chief in India, by recording his final testimony of the character and conduct of the army of India, and of all the officers and soldiers who have served under his command.

“ In attempting the discharge of that duty, his lordship feels it difficult, either to do justice to them or to his own feelings, under the mixed sensations of pride and regret, inseparable from the occasion of contemplating their merits, and of bidding adieu to officers and men, collectively and individually endeared to him by habits of intercourse and the mutual exertions of the spirit of professional enterprise, during the long period of six years, for the most part passed amidst the vicissitudes of climate and the laborious duties of the field, in the service of their king and country.

“ The merits and the services of the army, and of all the officers and troops engaged in the late arduous war in India, have been so repeatedly and emphatically expressed, and recorded by the supreme government of the British possessions in Asia, and the gratitude and

applause of the commander-in-chief have been so frequently called forth to express his admiration of the gallant spirit of enterprise and exertions of the officers, the steady discipline and undaunted valour of the troops, that the commander-in-chief feels any endeavour of his, to add to their reputation, would only tend to lessen its estimation, in proportion as the attempt must fall short of the praise which it deserves.

“ It therefore only remains for his lordship to express once more his most sincere and hearty thanks for the distinguished honour which he has derived from the gallant exertions and splendid successes of the British army in India; and to record that testimony, which personal observation and experience, during the period of six years, entitles him to pronounce : that the approbation which has been bestowed on them has been most eminently deserved, and that they have established a just and undoubted claim to the best rewards which can be conferred on them by a grateful government.

“ The commander-in-chief feels, that to ascribe any peculiar merit to the conduct by which the officers and soldiers, his countrymen, have been actuated, beyond what might attach to their distinguished valour and noble perseverance during a long and arduous war, would be felt only as a negative compliment. But he finds it difficult to do justice to the merits of our native soldiers, who have encountered every danger with the most exemplary valour; who have submitted to every hardship and privation with the utmost fortitude and perseverance; and who, to promote the cause in which they were engaged, have, on many occasions, made a ready

and cheerful sacrifice of every habit and prejudice which they had been taught to regard as dear and inviolable.

“ If any weight can attach to his success, or any influence be derived from the acknowledged national benefits that have been justly ascribed to the fortitude and valour of the British army in India, during the period of his command, the commander-in-chief will esteem it the greatest honour, and the highest gratification of his life. to employ that weight and influence in promoting the interests and exalting the character of that gallant army to which he now subscribes his affectionate farewell.

“ The remainder of his days will be enlivened by the recollection of those public services, which obtained for him the approbation of his king and country : and his Lordship will never cease to cherish the affectionate remembrance of the companions of his glory and the promoters of his success, during the eventful period of his long command in India.”

This is high praise, and the events which have occurred since the date of these orders in 1807, have made it still more deserved.

ERRATA.

Page 13, line 21, *for* should be *read* should all be
70, ,, 3, *for* azardous *read* hazardous
74, table, *for* mussulmen *read* mussulman
,, ,, *for* Bramin *read* Brahmin
81, line 5, *for* The other *read* Or the division
89, ,, 11, *for* Darogas *read* Daroghahs
94, last line, *for* Adaulut *read* Adawlut

